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JAG JUSTICE IN KOREA
by
ARTHUR JOHN KEEFFEt
At the request of the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy
and Air Force, there has been introduced into the 84th Congress a Bill
to amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice1 that took effect on May
31, 1951. Significantly, the bill lacks the support of the Court of Military
Appeals (COMA), the Secretary of the Treasury who heads the Coast
Guard, and the Civilian Court Committee appointed by COMA and
headed by Whitney North Seymour, the distinguished New York at-
torney. In the judgment of many people, the bill contains provisions
which will turn the clock back and destroy many reforms, won at the
close of World War 11.2
It was in the last hectic days of a session that the Uniform Code of
Military Justice was enacted. Senator Pat McCarran, fought gallantly in
the Senate to refer it to the Senate Judiciary Committee for a study, and
report to the Armed Services Committee within a limited period of time.
The American Bar Association, the American Legion and others had
pointed out serious faults in the Code that should be corrected. The
Senator wanted the lawyers on the Senate Judiciary Committee to point
out to the Armed Services Committee the needed corrections. By about
ten votes the motion to refer the bill to Judiciary for this purpose failed
and the Code with all its flaws became law. With the coming of peace,
the Congress has not had the time or political urge to consider courts
martial again.
Now would seem an appropriate time for a Senator to ask that the
Senate Judiciary Committee study not only this bill but also the objec-
tions which were made to the Code when it was so hastily enacted. A
Congressman should make a similar motion to refer it to the House Ju-
t Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America.
1 From a jurisprudential point of view there is a great deal to be said against Codes.
The provisions become too rigid. It would seem advisable so far as procedure is con-
cerned that the Congress create the suggested Advisory Council and allow it to suggest
rules of procedure to replace procedural code provisions to COMA and allow COMA
to promulgate rule changes as deemed necessary. COMA could report the rules to
Congress as the Supreme Court does.
2 Admiral Halloway in testimony before the Brooks Committee said that the Code
"has contributed immeasurably to the public confidence in the execution of military
discipline and justice" (p. 52). Moreover, the Congress is said to be greatly relieved
from pressing demands of parents by the creation of COMA. And Judge Latimer testi-
fied before the Brooks Committee that the Code has worked well under combat condi-
tions and its evils are more imaginary than real. If all this be so then the only amend-
ment worthy of consideration is one to strengthen it, not weaken it.
diciary Committee. The Armed Services Committees of both Houses
would then have the benefit of a study by the Committees upon which
most lawyers sit.
There are glaring weaknesses in the Code that cry for correction.
These were known at the time of its adoption. The military, splendid
officers and gentlemen as they are always, are resentful of any suggestions
by civilians for the reform of what they regard as their court-martial
system. Their approach has been to weather the storm of civilian criticism
that follows every war and when the hue and cry dies down, to return to
the old ways. The bill introduced in the 84th Congress is their first
legislative attempt to go backwards since the Code was enacted at the
close of World War II.
1. CONGRESS SHOULD CREATE A PERMANENT PAID PART-TIME CI-
VILIAN ADVISORY COUNCIL.
The principal weakness in the Code of Military Justice is its failure
to provide for a paid part-time Civilian Advisory Council to study con-
tinuously the operation of the Code and make its own independent recom-
mendations to the Armed Services and Judiciary Committees of the
Congress. The General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board of the
United States Navy of which the author was President, Felix Larkin, Esq.,
a draftsman of the Code of Military Justice, Vice-President, Professor
Robert Pasley of Cornell Law School, Research Director, and Frank
Cotter, Esq., Staff Director, foresaw that we would not obtain the reforms
we felt were needed, that some reforms might not work well and would
need correction, that in certain areas such as discharge and officer cases
more study and investigation was required. Accordingly, the Board con-
sisting not only of the civilians, above-named, but also of Admiral C. P.
Snyder, Captain Hunter Wood, Jr. and Commander A. W. Dickinson, Jr.
of the Navy, Captain Clifford G. Hines of the Navy's Medical Corps.,
Captain John A. Glynn of the Coast Guard and Colonel E. H. Murray
of the Marine Corps, unanimously asked that the Congress create a per-
manent Civilian Advisory Council. That little read and unpublished report
said then:
Many states have created such advisory bodies to aid their civil courts and
their performance has been highly satisfactory. [Sunderland, The Judicial
Council as an Aid to the Administration of Justice, (1941) Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 933.] Mr. Justice, Benjamin L. Cardozo, the principal advocate of
their creation, in a celebrated law review article, explains the reason for
their existence:
The duty must be cast on some man or group of men to watch the law in
action, observe the manner of its functioning, and report the changes needed
when function is deranged. . . . Recommendations would come with much
greater authority, would command more general acquiescence on the part
of legislative bodies, if those who made them were charged with the re-
sponsibilities of office. . . . Such a board would not only observe for itself
the workings of the law as administered day by day. It would enlighten
itself constantly through all available sources of guidance and instruction;
through consultation with scholars; through study of the law reviews, the
journals of social science, the publications of tie learned generally; and
through investigation of remedies and methods in other jurisdictions,
foreign and domestic. . . . Reforms that now get themselves made by
chance or after long and vexatious agitation, will have the assurance of
considerate speedy hearing. Scattered and uncoordinated forces will have
a rallying point and focus. [Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice (1921) 35
Harv. L. Rev. 113, 114-125.]
As a result of the recommendations of Judge Cardozo and other prominent
members of the legal profession, the New York State Law Revision Com-
mission was created to advise the New York Legislature on suggested changes
in substantive law and the Judicial Council was created to advise that legis-
lature on matters of procedure. [For a detailed study of the purpose and
objective of these New York agencies, see: Report of the Commission of
the Administration of Justice in New York State (1934), Legislative
Document No. 50, pp. 36 and 53; Saxe, the Judicial Council of the State
of New York; Its Objectives, Methods, and Accomplishments (1941)
35 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 933.]
. . . The recent revision of the procedural law of the federal courts, both
civil and criminal, has been similarly accomplished with the aid of such
an advisory committee appointed by the Supreme Court.
A similar board established by the Navy could recommend changes in the
court-martial system from time to time, based on its observation of the
practicability and workability of the court-martial system in operation
and based on its appraisal of current trends in civilian criminology. If the
legislatures of New York and other states and the Supreme Court of the
United States have found such advisory bodies helpful, there is every
reason to believe that the Secretary of the Navy and the Congress would find
such an advisory committee of great value in passing on proposals for
the reform of the naval court-martial system.
Speaking of the composition of such a permanent Advisory Council, the
Board said:
The composition of such an Advisory Committee with respect to the naval
court-martial system, warrants careful study. In general, the composition
can be patterned after the above-mentioned successful advisory bodies. It
would seem wise to have membership made up partly of persons outside
the regular navy service, so as to bring to their task an independent outside
view, and of course, a representative of the Judge Advocate General, a
representative of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and at least one officer
with general line experience. It would also be advisable to have on such
committee both a penologist and a psychiatrist.
It is believed that such a Board will serve a twofold purpose:
1. It will be in a position to make a complete examination of the naval
court-martial system;
2. It will provide a means of keeping the naval court-martial system
up-to-date and obviate the necessity of a periodic comprehensive reform
every twenty-five or fifty years.4
In a piece written on the eve of the passage of the code by the Senate
it was said:
We have seen the best of administrative agencies disintegrate for lack of
disinterested civilian criticism. In court-martial procedure governing civilian
soldiers and sailors, the armed services should welcome the creation of a
strong civilian advisory council. Wasn't it Roscoe Pound who long ago
pointed out that codes are rigid, codify errors and make changes more diffi-
cult? The only hope for improvement is to condition passage of the Code
upon the appointment of an advisory council-and this is what was sug-
a REPORT OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD 3-4 (1946-47).
AId. at 4-5.
gested by the Navy's General Court Martial Sentence Review Board in 1947.
Such a body can be relied upon to follow this court-martial reform to the
bitter end. In its permanent advisory capacity it can do all the things article
67 (g) only hints at and considerably more.
The opponents of reform rely upon the present pressure easing and civilian
lawyers losing interest. The stakes are too high. Let us hope that the
Senate will establish such a council. True reform lies that way.5
Article 67 (g) of the Code to which reference is made is the provi-
sion which directs COMA to meet once a year with the Judge Advocates
General and report to Congress. As predicted, the Judges at COMA have
been too busy to do the necessary research and their present disagreement
with the Judge Advocates General as to needed reforms indicates that if
the Code is to be changed, a body such as an Advisory Council must be
created by the Congress to do it.'
Not many people are aware how hard and conscientiously the Com-
mittees of our Congress work. Senators and Congressmen by and large
work round the clock. They are subject to pressures that would kill lesser
men. Day by day and in the closing of each session, they are forced to
vote with respect to the most complicated statutes that affect the well-
being of all of us. However important we regard courts martial, this is
but one subject of many of paramount public interest. The services have
their lobby at public expense. To counteract that lobby there should be
a permanent paid, part-time and independent Civilian Advisory Council.
The bill introduced by the services does not provide, as it should, for a
Civilian Advisory Council as the Navy Board requested.
2. CONGRESS SHOULD Now INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF OUR
KOREAN COURTS MARTIAL.
Almost ten years have passed without civilian study of courts martial
except for the trickle of cases that can be heard for legal technicalities
each year by COMA. Meanwhile, we have had the Korean War and from
the evidence available, it seems likely that the abuses in the courts of
World War I and II were still present in the Korean courts. Since Con-
gress failed to establish the Civilian Advisory Council there seems to be
no way now to achieve the needed reforms and review of Korean cases,
except through a Congressional inquiry. It may be that courts martial in
Korea were well conducted. If so, the services have nothing to fear. If
the Courts were not well conducted, then their conduct should be exposed
to public view.
5 Keeffe and Moskin, Codified Military Injustice, 35 Cornell L.Q. 151, 170 (1949).
6 This is evident from the 1956 hearings before the Brooks Committee, (Subcommit-
tee No. 1, House Armed Services Committee, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., hereinafter cited
Brooks Committee) where in their testimony Chief Judge Quinn and Judge Latimer
indicated there were many points of military law and practice on which they could not
express an opinion without further study. For instance, neither the court nor its Code
Committee has studied discharges (p. 357).
The author was able to study the complete court-martial record in
only two Korean cases, one which will be referred to as "Doe" and the
other as "Roe." The trial in each case was inexcusably conducted. The
suspicion that these two cases were typical caused the author to ask per-
mission of COMA to study the records in other Korean cases. An amazing
situation was revealed. It is the practice of the Judge Advocates General
and the Secretary of the Treasury to send to COMA the original court-
martial jacket in each case, and to require COMA to return each after its
decision. But when permission to examine these original records was
requested, it was refused.7
As a result, study of the Korean courts has been confined to the
written opinions of COMA and the two cases above-mentioned. From this
research, a selection of sentences has been made and appears in the ap-
pendix. From this cursory examination, there is reason to believe that
what passed for justice in our Korean courts may not have been the real
thing. This circumstantial evidence calls for a Congressional investiga-
tion.
3. IN HOW MANY KOREAN COURTS WAS DEFENDANT DENIED A
LAWYER?
In one of his early opinions Judge Brosman said:
We would be deaf, indeed, if we did not recognize that a major fault
found with military practice during the recent war was the allegedly recur-
rent failure to provide accused persons with legally trained counsel.,
The General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board of the Navy in 1946
reviewed a murder case defended by a layman, and a desertion in battle
case defended by a dentist.! When Judge Brosman said this was a major
fault in World War II courts martial, he understated the matter. One of
the few real reforms won in the Code of Military Justice was a require-
ment that law officers, prosecution and defense counsel, be lawyers. Now,
after all the criticism that led to this provision in the new Code, even
though it did not take effect until May 31, 1951, one would think that
the Army in May 1951, in Korea would see to it that in its general courts
the defendant was represented by a lawyer.
It was not so. Doe's trial record shows he was tried in May, 1951,
in Korea and was represented by an officer who was not a lawyer. Doe
swears this officer advised him not to take the stand and, though available,
7 The letters of refusal of the Judge Advocates General and the Secretary of the
Treasury appear verbatim in the appendix.
8 United States v. Bartholomew, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 307, 310, 3 C.M.R. 41, 44 (1952).9 
REPORT OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD 86-87 (1946-47).
Bertram Schwartz testified before the Brooks Committee that in World War II he tried
a murder case overseas where the defendant was represented by a dress goods salesman
(p. 230). He also calls attention to H.R. 7646 that has passed the 84th Congress and is now
Public Law 777. It provides lawyers free to our service men tried abroad under the Status
of Forces Agreement.
failed to call a key witness. The record itself is unintelligible. It consists
of the contradictory testimony of the Chinese and Korean witnesses. Not
one American testified against Doe. For a charge of stealing 32 cases of
C Rations, Doe was sentenced to five years imprisonment and a Dishon-
orable Discharge (D.D.). Doe's case was not the only one. The cases of
Phillips and Bartholomew in which Judge Brosman made his above-
quoted comment are two others.1"
4. WERE THE SENTENCES OF OUR KOREAN COURTS MARTIAL
Too SEVERE? WHY CHANGE D.D. To B.C.D.?
Like many other World War II veterans in 1956, years after Korea,
Doe will find that he cannot obtain G.I. benefits, public employment,
state or federal, nor any job with America's large corporations because of
his D.D. It is a permanent tattoo equivalent to civil death. Realizing the
magnitude of this sentence, the General Court-Martial Sentence Review
Board refused to participate in the discharges given by the Navy. Instead,
it urged that the proposed Civilian Advisory Council study what should be
done about discharges. During World War II, the Army gave many dif-
ferent types of discharges, but the effects of each were difficult to deter-
mine. At least the Navy had only two, the Dishonorable (D.D.) and the
Bad Conduct Discharge (B.C.D.).
When the General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board was requested
to recommend that the discharge of a prisoner be changed from a Dis-
honorable Discharge to a Bad Conduct Discharge, it inquired what con-
sequences were attached to a B.C.D. which were not attached to a D.D.
No one who was asked knew, yet for years, under the guise of leniency,
naval clemency boards had been changing D.D. to B.C.D. After proposing
that naval discharges be studied and the distinction between the D.D. and
B.C.D. be abolished, it was a considerable surprise to find that without the
requested study, the Army adopted the two discharges of the Navy. It
must be that the Army discharges were in a sorry state if the Army thought
the Navy's made sense. This illogical practice, masquerading as clemency,
persists today under the Code.
The study made by the General Court-Martial Sentence Review
Board revealed that for all practical purposes there is no difference between
a D.D. and a B.C.D. The consequences are almost identical" so that,
except for the sound of the label, no mercy is given to a prisoner by chang-
ing his D.D. to a B.C.D., but to this day every military man seems to
believe that the change means something. Were it not so tragic for so
10 United States v. Bartholomew, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 307, 310, 3 C.M.R. 41, 44 (1952);
United States v. Phillips, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 316, 3 C.M.R. 50 (1952).
IL REPORT OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEw BOARD 318-19 (1946-
47).
many youngsters, the adoption of this system of the Navy by the Army and
in the Code would be comical indeed.
5. THE SPECIAL COURT SHOULD BE ROBBED OF ITS POWER To
GIVE A B.C.D. AND ALL SERVICES SHOULD BE DEPRIVED OF THE
RIGHT To GIVE AN UNDESIRABLE DISCHARGE OR ANY SIMILIAR
ONE WITHOUT A GENERAL COURT MARTIAL.
Realizing the severity of a B.C.D. in its effect upon the man's future
life, the General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board asked that its pro-
posed Advisory Council study whether the special (then called Summary)
court martial "should continue to have the power to impose it".12
Before the Code was adopted, it was pointed out that under it, the
special court could grant a B.C.D. Unlike the general court, counsel of a
special court need not be lawyers. Any court that gives a B.C.D. should
have all the safeguards of a general court. The point was made that "either
the power to award bad conduct discharges must be taken from special
courts, or the safeguards necessary to granting of full justice must be pro-
vided."'"
As above-stated, section 67 (g) of the Code directs the Judges of the
Court of Military Appeals and the Judge Advocates and the Secretary of
the Treasury to report each year as to needed changes. The reporting group
is called the "Code Committee." In its first report they recommended "that
legislation be enacted prohibiting special courts-martial from adjudging
bad conduct discharges." " In support of their recommendation the Code
Committee said:
Experience has shown that the exercise of the power to adjudge punitive
discharges by special courts has impaired the efficient administration of
military justice. This impairment falls into two main categories, namely;
considerable expense to the United States not commensurate with the results
obtained, and inadequate protection of the rights of the United States and
the accused at the trial level. Specific impediments to proper administration
are: (1) Unavailability of and lack of requirement for legally trained per-
sonnel as court members or counsel. The absence of legally trained personnel
from the trial of cases results in a high percentage of records replete with
error requiring reversals, rehearings, proceedings in revision and other cor-
rective action. The trial standards which should be required before a punitive
discharge penalty is assessed cannot be reached in the absence of attorneys
and counselors at law. (2) The paucity of court reporters, particularly
in overseas commands. This results in expensive time lags in the processing
of cases. (3) Before special court-martial sentences involving bad conduct
discharges may be carried into execution the same appellate procedures
required for general court-martial cases must be accomplished and in addi-
tion the action of another headquarters is involved. Since the maximum
time of confinement which may be imposed by a special court-martial
is 6 months and the actual time served under such a sentence, with time off
for good behavior, is 5 months, many accused have served their time and
12 1d. at 322.
13 Keeffe and Moskin, Codified Military Injustice, 35 Cornell L.Q. 151, 157, 168
(1949).
14 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND
THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES 4 (1952).
have been released from confinement before appellant review is complete.
Thus, many men under sentence of a punitive discharge are on a quasi-duty
status; a situation which results in tremendous housekeeping and pay prob-
lems. 1 5
Strange as it may seem, no bill appears to have been introduced to
carry out this recommendation, and in its second annual report, COMA
says:
As a final recommendation, the Court invites attention to the one it spon-
sored in the initial Annual Report, to the effect that the jurisdiction of a
special court-martial under Article 19 of the Code be limited so that a
bad-conduct discharge may not be adjudged as part of a sentence. While this
recommendation does not have the unanimous approval of the Services,
the reasons for its enactment are still cogent and will not be repeated. No
significant improvement in the trial tactics and techniques in cases before
special courts-martial has been observed during the additional period of time
covered by this report. Accordingly, the Court adheres to its original
recommendation. 10
During the interval between the first and second annual reports, no
doubt realizing how impossible it was to make the comprehensive study
envisaged by 67 (g) of the Code, COMA appointed its Court Committee
under the Chairmanship of Whitney North Seymour, Esq. The other
members are Ralph B. Boyd, Henry T. Dorrance, Felix E. Larkin, Joseph
A. McClain, Jr., George A. Spiegelberg, Arthur E. Sutherland and Don-
ald L. Deming. In its report to COMA, the Court Committee speaking
of this recommendation said:
The Committee agreed that the recommendation previously submitted to the
Congress and the Judge Advocates General of the Army and the Air Force
in their last Annual Report to eliminate the bad-conduct discharge from the
competency of special courts-martial was entirely sound and should be re-
newed and supported.
17
Despite the failure to carry it out in the pending bill" there is a provi-
sion permitting one officer instead of three to conduct a special court-
martial, providing the officer is a lawyer and the accused so requests in
writing upon the advice of counsel. The Court Committee" supports
this provision and so does COMA."0 One cannot help but note that this
would empower one officer to give a B.C.D., for there is no change in
the bill prohibiting special courts from giving a B.C.D. Unless the rec-
ommendation of the First Code Committee be followed and the right of
a special court to give a B.C.D. be removed, the provision is dangerous
and should not be enacted.
15ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND
THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES 4-5 (1952).
16 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND
THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES 19-20 (1953).
17 Id. at 24.
18 S. 2133 and H.R. 6583, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND
THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES 24-25 (1953).
20ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND
THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES 5 (1954).
This position was supported before the Brooks Committee by Ber-
tram Schwartz, Esq., representing the Queens County and New York
States Bar Associations.2 Mr. Schwartz lectures on military law at New
York University and states he favors command control of courts martial.
Nevertheless in his testimony before the Brooks Committee, he came out
flatly against permitting any special court, even of one officer, to give a
B.C.D. Charles E. Lofgren, National Secretary of the Fleet Reserve As-
sociation, also testifying before the Brooks Committee, said that only a
general court should give a punitive discharge. His Association views
the increasing number of discharges as a growing social problem.
Moreover, Mr. Schwartz calls attention to the fact that in response
to the demand for general courts martial, the services have been giving
"Undesirable Discharges". Administratively and for all practical pur-
poses such a discharge is the equivalent of a B.C.D. or a D.D. Mr.
Schwartz believes no man should be given an "Undesirable Discharge"
against his request for a general court. This appears to be a minimum
position and fairness would compel a general court. Our past experience
indicates that men in trouble are not in a position to judge the perma-
nent consequences of such consent. Also, the action of Secretary Wilson
in giving dishonorable discharges without a hearing to the prisoners who
refused to leave Red China, indicates there is need to check the entire
Defense Department from giving any punitive discharge to anyone with-
out a hearing.
In a recent decision Judge Edelstein, in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, had occasion to consider
the power of the services to give an undesirable discharge for conduct
that took place in civilian life before induction. He said the issuance of
such a discharge was a denial of due process of law.2
21 For the testimony of Bertram Schwartz see the transcript of the hearings of the
Brooks Committee (p. 221 et seq.).
22 The decision of Judge Edelstein is said to have been in the case of the so-called
Useless Eight. See the transcript where the opinion appears in full, and File C-103-331
in the Southern District under the title Bernstein, Inductees in the Army of the United
States v. Lieutenant General Thomas W. Herrien, Commanding General of Fort Jay. The
discharges were pursuant to Army Regulation 604-10 and have been the subject of
study by the Hennings Constitutional Rights Committee of the Senate in both sessions
of the 84th Congress. Mr. Schwartz states that Senator Hennings wants the services to
decide as to pre-service conduct before induction. The excuse for giving draftees an
"Honorable Separation" seems to be that afterwards they serve up to seven years in the
reserve but as Mr. Schwartz says they should be recalled-not separated-after an honorable
discharge. Mr. Schwartz testified that men bat at his door asking to have their bad
discharges changed. And he says for a service man a punitive discharge, "hangs around
his neck like an albatross" (p. 219). In the case of the Undesirable Discharge he says
it "has not had real true process of law". Apparently the accused is not represented by a
lawyer before the boards that give the Undesirable Discharge (p. 228). And other
due process guarantees appear to be absent. Mr. Schwartz discusses the Queens Bill at
pp. 221-22; undesirable discharges at pp. 223-26 and Wilson's action with respect to our
non-returning POW's on p. 259. In this connection Congressman Bray stated that a
The subject has interested the Queens Bar Association for a long
time and one of its Congressmen in a prior Congress introduced a bill
to require a trial before any discharge other than honorable can be
given. This seems to be an admirable way to phrase an amendment to
the Code since draftees, after their two years hitch, receive an "Honora-
ble Separation" instead of an "Honorable Discharge". From the above it
can be seen that the discharge problem today is worse than when the
General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board studied it in 1946. Study
by an Advisory Council is overdue.
6. THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH A DESERTER LOSES His CITIZEN-
SHIP OUGHT To BE CHANGED.
When a man in service goes "over the hill," he can be convicted
of either "Absence Without Leave," called in military parlance "AW-
OL," or "Desertion," depending on whether he intended to return. The
fact patterns are close and not even COMA has been able to agree always
in distinguishing "AWOL" from "Desertion". More confusing, however,
is why the Congress should have a special federal statute depriving the
deserter of his citizenship when the same penalty is not given to the rapist
or the murderer. As presently constituted, COMA cannot review every
case2 3 and the result is that now, as in the past, many a lad will be dis-
charged as deserter, causing him to lose his civil rights when his crime
was "AWOL". The General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board called
attention to the problem for study by its proposed Advisory Council, but
with no Advisory Council there has been no study or change. 4
7. THE MILITARY SHOULD STOP CUTTING OFF FAMILY ALLOW-
ANCES OF CONVICTED SERVICEMEN.
The heaviest burden resulting from military discipline falls upon
the innocent family of the Offender. The practice in general courts is
to cut the pay of the accused on his conviction. And no civilian objection
to this or any other disciplinary measure can be offered after the services
give the offender a proper hearing. Punishing him is one thing; but
a pay cut as in Doe's case, above-mentioned, and in other cases cuts off
that part of the man's pay that is being sent home as a family allotment.
With the bread winner incarcerated the hardship suffered by his family
at home is beyond the comprehension of anyone but the local Community
bill in 1949 permitted the President to give a D.D. without a hearing; and it was not
until the bill reached the floor that the provision was knocked out (p. 259). For the
testimony of Charles Lofgren on behalf of the Fleet Reserve Association see p. 313 of
the transcript of the Brooks Committee. The illegality of the action of Secretary Wilson is
demonstrated by Professor Robert S. Pasley in "Sentence First-Verdict Afterwards: Dis-
honorable Discharge Without Trial by Court Martial?" in 41 Cornell Law Quarterly 545
(Summer, 1956).
2s See Point 9 inlra.
24
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Chest, the local Red Cross Chapter, the Salvation Army, and the family
priest, rabbi or minister. No matter what the man's crime, wreaking
vengeance on his dependent and innocent family at home has no place
in American life. The Congress should put a stop to it. The services'
point of view is that pressure from home will make the man behave and,
if we had a professional army, one could admit they have a point. But we
have a civilian army; and men are taken involuntarily to serve, making
their families at home dependent on their military pay for existence. It
is a small price to pay for this civilian force, to require the military to
refrain from punishing the innocent family whom the draftee leaves at
home while he reluctantly serves.
8. THE SENTENCES RENDERED By OUR KOREAN COURTS MARTIAL
WERE Too LONG.
Guilt or innocence aside what is to be gained by giving a sentence
of five years in jail, a dishonorable discharge and a loss of pay for the
crime of stealing 32 cases of C rations? Making every allowance for the
necessities of discipline, a sentence of five years for such an offense is too
long. When you add to it the permanent, life-long stigma of a D.D., with
its loss of G.I. benefits, the loss of his own pay and the cutting off of that
part of his pay that goes home to support his family, we see in full perspec-
tive how much more severe a military court-martial sentence like Doe's is
than the civilian, for the comparable crime.
Another Korean trial is the case of Richard Roe who shipped out of
Tokyo for Korea. Before departing he had complained that one testicle
pained him. The medical people mistakenly advised him he was all right.
He went to Korea. He fought gallantly in combat, his testicle hurting all
the while. He complained again to the medical outfit. He was told to
forget it. The battle over, the pain intense, Roe took off "over the hill"
and went many miles south to the nearest base hospital. After being
locked up for being AWOL, Roe after a day or two was admitted to the
hospital. Surgery, rarely necessary, was exercised to correct his ailment
and he was then returned to his outfit. His superior officers did not let
him return to combat where he was needed. Instead, he was court-mar-
tialled and sentenced to 25 years-this for a combat soldier who goes to
a base hospital for surgery!
A glance at the Korean sentences listed in the Appendix and drawn
from the few opinions of COMA available, indicates that far from being
exceptional, sentences of this length for comparatively insignificant of-
fenses were rather common in our Korean courts. When one member of
Roe's court was interviewed, he had no recollection of the case. Explain-
ing his failure to remember so unusual a case, he said every sentence of
the court the month or so he was a member of it was fifteen to twenty-five
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years. Under these circumstances how could he be expected to remember
anyone. More important, how could he be expected to exercise any judg-
ment as to the justness of the sentence?
Roe's case establishes that, despite all the criticism of the practice
after World War II, the Judge Advocate General of the Army in Korea
had established permanent courts. Permanent courts can become callous.
To insure just sentences courts must be selected ad hoc. During World
War II the Army had permanent courts and the Judge Advocates liked
them but in reporting their love of them, they confessed there was an
opposite point of view.
Permanent courts. Some commands utilized relatively permanent courts
when and where it was possible to do so and report that the procedure
contributed to a better administration of military justice. The system is
criticized by some, for it is said that such courts are inclined to become
callous and impose unconscionable sentences. This was true in some cases.
The sentences imposed by a court in Western Base Section for trial of First
U.S. Army and other combat troops shortly before D-Day (6 June 1944)
were so severe that almost all of them were reduced at least 50 percent by
the reviewing authority. Relatively permanent courts appointed by the
Commanding General, Seine Section, Communications Zone and sitting in
Paris, France, imposed death penalties for desertion, none of which were
executed on 11 accused between 8 March 1945 and 27 April 1945.
Nevertheless, the great majority of judge advocates who expressed an opinion
favor permanent courts.
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It is obvious that there is nothing in the Code of Military Justice
to prevent the establishment of permanent courts and, despite the criticism
of them, the Judge Advocate General of the Army set them up in Korea
just as he tried cases as late as May, 1951, without providing the defend-
ants with lawyers. The resulting outrageous length of the Korean sen-
tences would seem to be his responsibility.
9. SHOULD COMA HAVE THE RIGHT To REDUCE SENTENCES?
Curiously, a reading of the opinions of COMA will reveal that no
provision has been made in the Code of Military Justice for COMA to
review a sentence except for illegality. To meet the difficulty, in a number
of cases COMA has sent the case back to the Judge Advocate General
(JAG) and asked him to consider reducing it. This is admirable under
the circumstances but where the sentence in the opinion of COMA is out
of proportion to the offense, whether legal or not, COMA should be em-
powered to correct the injustice and not have to rely on a JAG to do so.
When it is appreciated that, as above indicated, the average court-
martial sentence is much more severe than the average comparable civil-
ian counterpart, and has a permanent punishment that follows the
recipient to his grave, it becomes a national necessity that the Court of
25 REPORT OF THE GENERAL BOARD, UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
ON Military Justice Administration in Theaters of Operations as quoted in REPORT OF
GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD 65-66 (1946-47).
Military Appeals be given the right to supervise sentences and change
them when it feels they are overly severe. This Court, whose record
has been so outstanding, is the institution to which the Congress and the
parents of America look for protection from too severe military sentences.
It should not have to ask the Judge Advocates General to reduce such
sentences. The Congress should see to it that the Court has the power
to change any military sentence in any way it sees fit.
10. THERE SHOULD BE A Top CLEMENCY BOARD.
When other efforts to free Doe from his sentence failed, he sought
clemency. But he was told his counsel could not appear either before
the local prison board or the highest one in Washington. The result was
that the application Doe made for restoration to duty was passed on com-
pletely in secret by a board that refused even to identify itself to Doe's
counsel or hear him. This is not calculated to inspire confidence in the
judgment of the military prison boards. Realizing fully the permanent
stigma of a D.D. or a B.C.D., Doe counted on a fair, open and public
hearing of his application for restoration to duty. To him it was civil
life or death. His right to join the American Legion; to march in the
Fourth of July parade; to buy a house, all were at stake. When so brutal
a sentence is meted out our Government prison boards should hear coun-
sel for the prisoner and identify themselves by name in a public decision
that can be reviewed before a top clemency board, just like COMA.
The General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board had a lot to do
with clemency. It reviewed sentences for clemency and made suggestions
for the substantive reform of courts martial; and was the only civilian
board to do both after World War II. Since most courts-martial prisoners
are guilty, students of military justice recognize that the clemency or re-
habilitation problem is important. For this reason the General Court-
Martial Sentence Review Board asked that its proposed Advisory Council
consider setting up a Top Clemency Review Board having equal standing
with COMA, and compel it to make an annual report to the Armed Serv-
ices Committees of the Congress.26 But the Congress failed to create such
a Board and Doe had none to which he could appeal. An established
independent board whose decisions and files were public like COMA
would view Doe's application differently. But even if it did not, Doe
might have felt better about their adverse decision.
26Id. at 230-233. In testimony before the Brooks Committee Chief Judge Quinn
favored giving COMA power to review a sentence. Judge Latimer opposed it. Judge
Ferguson took no position. Both Quinn and Latimer thought that if a court gave life
for one day of AWOL they would call the sentence unconscionable and set it aside; but
both doubted that COMA had the power to do this now. Latimer reasons that if COMA
has the power to change a sentence clemency will be thrust upon it, which would
involve matterl other than law. In this he has a point. That is why a Top Clemency
Board equal in dignity and standing to COMA must be established (pp. 345-46-47 et seq.).
11. PROVISION SHOULD BE MADE So THAT WORLD WAR II AND
KOREAN DISCHARGES CAN BE CHANGED.
For some time now the American Legion has had under considera-
tion a proposal that men discharged from service with a D.D. or B.C.D.
might apply to an appropriate board and on a showing of good behavior
in civilian life apply to have their discharges changed to honorable. A
Top Clemency Review Board could perform this valuable service. Not
too long ago a young marine applied to the administrative discharge
board of the Navy to change his discharge from dishonorable to honora-
ble. After fighting gallantly in the Pacific, in almost the last month of
his enlistment, he stole about two hundred dollars from a marine PX.
His predecessor had been doing it when there was an "overage." The
"overage" he supposed was there, turned out to be an "underage."
No one could quarrel with his sentence. He deserved to go to jail
despite his combat record. But after serving two-thirds of his sentence,
he applied for restoration to duty. He was refused and discharged with
a B.C.D. His applications to change this discharge were refused by both
the Navy's administrative board and. by the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy. He was told that no matter what the circumstances the marines will
never restore a thief to duty. It was the same attitude the General Court-
Martial Sentence Review Board encountered, but fortunately James For-
restal was then Secretary of the Navy and on the Board's recommendation
the Secretary restored to duty youngsters with good records who made the
mistake of stealing once. The problem is reducible to the conflict between
exercising mercy on the individual and admitting to military service only
those who never make a mistake. For professional soldiers, sailors and
marines, this may be all right, but for civilian armies and navies, it is all
wrong. Confirmed thieves should not be restored to duty nor should we
now change their discharge to honorable. But young boys, who fought
so well when we all needed them and made the sad mistake of stealing
once and serving time for it, should now receive an honorable discharge.
In reviewing courts martial for the Navy the General Court-Martial Sen-
tence Review Board found that the Bureau of Naval Personnel had the
same attitude about hiring as a large corporation. When a lad gets into
court-martial trouble, he is usually guilty of something. If the services can
obtain by enlistment or draft a man whose record is unblemished, why
should they restore to duty a man convicted by court martial?
This attitude is understandable, misguided though it be. The services
want to do a good job. They want the best men. It is hard for them to
understand our civilian viewpoint, that these are not professionals. They
are the sons and daughters of the American people that, as civilians, the
services have drafted and to whom they owe a duty. That duty is, if they
make a mistake, to exercise charity and mercy.
In my judgment there is no hope of achieving charity for first offend-
ers who steal, unless a top independent civilian clemency board be estab-
lished. The Congress should do it and investigate thoroughly the clemency
methods now used, starting at the prisons, which though they needed it,
escaped any investigation following World War II. Of course, it is obvious
no Congressional Committee can do all there is to be done, but if it sets
up a Civilian Advisory Council, that body can complete the job. We
cannot leave the question of restoration to duty to the services when their
judgment is so oppressed by such a genuine conflict of interest. The last
person to decide on restoration is the commander of the outfit where a lad
gets into trouble. But even he is better than civilians charged with admin-
istration. An independent body, like COMA, is needed.27
Perhaps, the principal reason that led to the enactment of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice was the disparity in sentences for the same
offense. Admiral Tausig, the beloved head of the Naval Clemency Board
during World War II pointed out that the Navy had one Admiral at San
Francisco who gave a 25 year sentence for the same offense that the Ad-
miral at San Diego gave 5 years. The General Court-Martial Sentence
Review Board found that the Admiral at Norfolk seemed to have a stand-
ard 15 year sentence, no matter the offense. Since the Navy executed
Phillip Spencer, the nephew of the then Secretary of War, by stringing
him to the yardarm of the brig Somers in 1842, it has yet to administer
the death penalty to any sailor or officer. During World War II, the
Army had over 100 executions, mostly of negroes. It was a source of great
embarrassment to the Army and the Navy's policy abolishing capital pun-
ishment was a source of pride to it.
But from the point of view of the parent, an abolition of capital
punishment in one service and its practice in another was most disturbing.
We are fortunate indeed that with one exception most of the Army execu-
tions seem to have been more than justified. But the fact remains the
General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board saw cases where execution
was equally justified and only Navy policy stopped it.
Despite all this experience in World War II and before, observe the
sentences listed in the appendix. They seem helter, skelter, without rhyme
27 In pointing out that only a general court with its safeguards should give the D.D.,
the B.C.D. or the U.D., Mr. Schwartz, in his testimony before the Brooks Committee,
attacked the hearings before the boards that gave Undesirable Discharges. He contended
that they are secret, and give the accused a hearing without a lawyer (pp. 224-30). The
experience of Schwartz before the Naval Board for Discharges and Dismissals convinces
him that no punitive discharge will ever be changed except for a gross miscarriage of
justice. As a practical matter, then, review of discharges before such boards is worthless
(p. 226). Nor says Schwartz have the Judge Advocates General changed such discharges
(p. 227).
or reason. There is no consistency. The same hit or miss method of sen-
tencing remains. To give a sentence that is fair is a difficult art. A Top
Clemency Board can come close to civilian crimes and establish near
uniform service policies. The General Court-Martial Sentence Review
Board of the Navy demonstrated this in a special unread, unpublished
report analyzing sentences. Time has come for the Top Clemency Board
it requested."8
12. THE WORST FAULT IN THE COURT-MARTIAL SYSTEM, Is THAT
THE COMMANDER SELECTS THE COURT, REALLY THE CIVILIAN
JURY, AND PASSES ON THE FITNESS OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVO-
CATE.
There is something fundamentally wrong with any system of justice
which, after the criticism it received in World Wars I and II, would in
the Korean conflict sentence Doe and Roe to five and twenty-five years,
with loss of pay and family allotments, and the permanent stigma of the
D.D. or the B.C.D. The basic fault is that the commanding officer picks
the members of the court martial, which is the military equivalent of the
civilian jury, and the staff judge advocate who has charge of courts martial
on the post serves under his direction. The commanding officer is a layman
but under the system he passes on the conduct of his staff judge advocate.
If this officer is to be promoted, his conduct must please his commander,
called in court-martial language, the convening authority. The staff judge
advocate and the accused's immediate unit commander prepare the charges
against the accused and then the commander selects the members of the
court that are to try him. In making the selection the staff judge advocate
is free to keep a record of how court-martial panels voted in the prior
courts on which they sat, and advise him. It is as if the district attorney
in civilian life were permitted by law to select the jurors who would try
the persons accused. Sometimes the commander picks a permanent court
which becomes callous and careless. Even then, if a court-member's vote
displeases him the commander can replace him with a Bloody Jeffries.
However, even in a court selected ad hoc the commander is free to select
whom he wants. Commenting on this power of the commander to select
the members of the courts martial, Professor Morgan, the draftsman of
the Code of Military justice, said:
\
28 "The Army executed over 100 men in World War II. The Navy has not exe-
cuted a man since 1842, the year in which Midshipman Philip Spencer and two others
were hanged at sea for conspiracy to mutiny. Midshipman Spencer was a nephew of the
Secretary of War, John C. Spencer. He was a graduate of Hobart and when Andrew D.
White, the first President and co-founder of Cornell University, entered Hobart, he took
his room." Today he is best remembered in the Chi Psi fraternity drinking song. Keeffe
and Moskin, Codified Military Injustices, 35 Cornell L.Q. 151, 152 n.6 (1949).
The control of the appointing and other superior military authority over the
court and its findings is to the civilian the most astonishing characteristic
of the court-martial system. The number of officers, between the statutory
maximum and the statutory minimum, to be detailed to a general or special
court is determined by the appointing authority whose decision thereon is
final . . . thus the membership of the court, both as to numbers within
statutory limits and as to personnel, is entirely within the control of the
appointing or superior military authority at all times.
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Comparing the powers of the commander to pick the members
of the court to the attempt of President Franklin Roosevelt to pack the
Supreme Court of the United States, Professor Max Rheinstein of the
University of Chicago commented:
In court-martial proceedings we have already seen that the court is not a
permanent institution but is convened ad hoc for every single case. Thus
the convening officer determines the composition of the court. . . . When
in 1937, the President of the United States asked Congress to enable him
to appoint new judges to the Supreme Court, his proposal was denounced
as an attempt to 'pack the Court' and as a monstrous scheme to subvert
one of the most sacred principles of Anglo-American Justice. Under his
bill the President would not have the power of determining ad hoc the
composition of the Supreme Court for every single case; still less would he
have been able to change the personnel of a federal court during the
pendency of a trial. Yet both these powers pertain to a commanding general
in the Army. Naturally, these provisions have been criticized and, if
military law had met with the greater interest among lawyers and the public
of this country, the criticism would probably have been more outspoken.8 0
To remedy this situation Senator Chamberlain in his bill following
World War I, proposed that the commander designate a panel of officers
from whom the staff judge advocate should select a court.8 ' The bill stip-
ulated that the staff judge advocate was to be independent of the com-
mander; but even this insufficient reform was defeated, 2 and the Code of
Military Justice makes no change in selection.
The court-martial system permits the commanding officer to select
the members of the court which is to try the accused and it requires him
also to pass on the fitness of his staff judge advocate. The staff judge
advocate that fails to jump through the hoops for the commander risks
his future career. This is not to say there are not staff judge advocates
that do stand up to the commanders, nor commanders who do give their
staff judge advocates freedom to do as they think best. But the command-
ing officer who orders a general court naturally and honestly thinks the
accused deserves it. Human nature and lawyers being what they are, if
the commander feels that discipline demands a conviction for camp ex-
ample, as is so often the case, some commanders are bound to resent an
acquittal of the particular accused ordered for trial.
2 REPORT OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD 63-64 (1946-
47) quoting from Morgan, The Existing Court-Martial System and the Anzell Articles,
29 Yale L.J. 52, 60 (1919).
30 Id. at 63 citing Rheinstein, Military Justice in WAR AND LAW 167 n. 97.
sl The power to select a court cannot be delegated to a staff judge advocate without
amending the Code and Manual for Courts Martial. See recent case p. 73 this number.
82 REPORT OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD 65 (1946-47).
When the civilian jury is drawn, the array is selected by the Jury
Commissioner from the wheel containing the names of eligible jurors in
the county. Under the Constitution there cannot be any systematic ex-
clusion from the list of eligible jurors. From the array, thus indiscrim-
inately selected, trial counsel select 12 jurors good and true and the Court
allows counsel challenges both peremptory and for cause. The military
does not follow this procedure. In a murder case, where the jury is selected
indiscriminately, a civilian lawyer gets 20 peremptory challenges. But
under the Code, where the convening authority is free to pick the court
members, the defense gets one peremptory challenge.
If there be need to assign an officer to be "Officer of the Day," the
selection is by lot and indiscriminate. So is the selection for many other
post duties. But not so for court-martial duty. The commander is free
to select for his general courts those officers who will regularly return
a long sentence, and exclude defense-minded officers by keeping a record
of how selected panels vote. This is unfortunate. At the trial level there
should be a requirement that members of courts martial be selected by
lot, or names of all available officers be drawn from a wheel.
13. THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL SHOULD NOT BE UNDER THE
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE. THERE SHOULD BE A PROSECUTION JUDGE
ADVOCATE AND A DEFENSE JUDGE ADVOCATE WHOSE FITNESS
REPORTS SHOULD BE UNDER SIMILAR JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERALS
IN WASHINGTON.
At the trial level the prosecuting staff judge advocate should be
under the direction of a Prosecuting Judge Advocate General in Wash-
ington and there should be a defense staff judge advocate under the direc-
tion of a Defense Judge Advocate General in Washington. The one
should have his fitness report judged by a Prosecution Judge Advocate
General and the other by a Defense Judge General in Washington.
Neither would then be subject to the commander.
Even if the military will not give up the right of the commanding
officer to accuse and then judge the conviction for both legality and clem-
ency, at least then the system would permit the commander to hear both
the prosecution and the defense. It would not require one staff judge
advocate to represent both points of view and try to please the com-
mander, too. Moreover, then the defense counsel on the trial would be
selected by the Defense Judge Advocate and owe responsibility only to
him. As it is now he is responsible to the man that the commander counts
upon to enforce camp discipline, much like the civilian chief of police
or district attorney. The American Bar Association, the American Legion,
Senator Chamberlain from Oregon, (after World War I), this writer and
many others struck at this feature of the court-martial system at the close
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of World War II. It is the jugular vein of the court-martial system and
until there is a change the court-martial system is bound to be funda-
mentally unsound and unjust.
14. LONG TRIAL SENTENCES ARE INEVITABLE UNDER THE PRES-
ENT COURT-MARTIAL SYSTEM.
The inevitable consequence of this court-martial system at the trial
level is to cause the packed court to return a long sentence and leave the
fixing of a proper sentence to the commander who ordered the trial and
made the charges. This would not be so bad if the commander were there
to hear and see the defendant and the witnesses, and hear the argument
of counsel for the prosecution and the defense. But his many duties pre-
vent this. The results are long sentences by trial courts, such as the two
meted out to Doe and Roe. In their cases, however, the commander did
not reduce them.
When the trial ends the case is reported to the commanding officer
by the staff judge advocate in a document called the Staff Judge Advo-
cate's Review. The commander, too busy to attend the trial, decides on
the basis of this statement to approve or disapprove the court-martial
conviction and whether to exercise or withold clemency. This is the
Achilles heel of the system. The commanding general who ordered the
trial, but did not attend it, sits in judgment of the conviction, not only for
legality but also for clemency. And his own staff judge advocate, who is
also absent from the trial, advises him. It is as if, after conviction, the
civilian judge called the district attorney to his chambers for a probation
report and personal advice, except that in this instance the staff judge
advocate, being subject to the commander, lacks the independence of the
civilian district attorney.
15. THE "STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE'S REVIEW" Is NOT EVEN EXHIB-
ITED To DEFENSE COUNSEL, BUT IT IS SHOWN To THE COMMAN-
DER AND COMA.
Viewing courts martial as primarily for discipline, the staff judge
advocate who handles them for the commanding officer is very much a
prosecutor. Like every prosecutor when he brings a case he wants a con-
viction. Staff Judge Advocate's Reviews' treatment of convictions are in
the nature of things, affected with the prosecutor's zeal. And some have
been known to include camp gossip and unverified hearsay. This is why
the document is so dangerous. False statements can be made in it that
ruin the accused's chance for clemency or rehabilitation. But not only is
the Review in danger of being colored by the bias of the prosecutor, it is
written by the staff judge advocate to his commander, reporting to him on
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how well officers under his command carried out his orders. It advises
the commander who made the accusation whether the staff judge advo-
cate's staff duly executed his command. To write it, a staff judge advo-
cate must have three capacities: judge, district attorney and defense
counsel.
Significantly the trial records of both Doe and Roe do not contain the
Staff Judge Advocate's Review. On appeal of Doe's case his counsel re-
quested a copy of the Staff Judge Advocate's Review, but the Judge Ad-
vocate General of the Army refused to furnish it. Yet the opinions in
COMA indicate that this same Judge Advocate General furnishes to
COMA Reviews which he refuses to supply to Defense Counsel." It must
be that the jackets the JAGS send to COMA and so quickly retrieve and
secret in their offices away from public inspection contain Staff Judge
Advocate Reviews. Since Doe's case went to COMA, it may well be
the jacket in his case that was refused his counsel went to COMA. This is a
very important matter that the Congress should investigate thoroughly.
16. THE BOARDS OF REVIEW IN THE OFFICES OF THE JUDGE ADVO-
CATES GENERAL ARE A WASTE OF TIME AND MONEY AND PRO-
DUCTIVE OF INJUSTICE.
Before the Code was enacted this was said as to the Boards of Review
it proposed:
In any event, review by Boards of Review as constituted by this Code
seems to be an unnecessary step and a waste of time and money. It cannot
be expected that such boards, appointed by the Judge Advocate General,
will give the disinterested impartial review necessary. Just as the trial
court has been shown to be under the domination of the convening
authority, so too, will the boards of review come under the domination
of the Judge Advocate General. The Judge Advocate General is not, and
by the nature of his office and appointment cannot be, an impartial judicial
officer. He is to enforce discipline and he is to give defense.
In an effort to resolve this conflict the English have separated the prosecu-
tion and defense sides of the office of their Judge Advocate General. They
have further provided that the Judge Advocate be a civilian appointed on
the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor and be responsible to him.
Thus, the English reforms have freed the Judge Advocate General from
the control of the Secretaries for State and Air. This is in sharp contrast
to the American reforms which have served only to compound the inherent
infirmity in the department.
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This prediction seems to have come to pass. Witness the failure of
the Boards of Review to correct sentences like Doe's and Roe's, and their
giving approval to the many long sentences listed in the Appendix to this
article. When the Boards of Review are under the control of the Judge
Advocate General they cannot be expected to work well. In many ways
they are more powerless than the trial courts. The Judge Advocate Gen-
83 United States v. McCrary, I U.S.C.M.A. 1, 1 C.M.R. 1 (1951).
4 Keeffe and Moskin, Codified Military Injustice, 35 Cornell L.Q. 151, 163 (1949).
eral combines in one person the dual function of district attorney and
defense counsel; and like the staff judge advocate, he, too, is subject to
the chief of staff. Officers sitting on these Boards of Review can be hired
or fired, promoted or demoted by the Judge Advocate General. To expect
these Boards to decide cases according to their conscience is being entirely
optimistic.
If a sentence seems too rough and the Judge Advocate General
might be adversely criticized for its handling by COMA, he is free to use
Boards of Review to sweep it under the rug. This can be done in many
ways that save face, such as reducing the sentence to the point where it
is unwise for the man to appeal further. Considering the expense in-
volved, the Congress should carefully investigate how these Boards of
Review have conducted themselves and whether the time of the officers
thus engaged would not be more profitably spent at the trial level pre-
paring cases for direct appeal to COMA and in interviewing prisoners.
Granted that elimination of. the Boards of Review would increase the
work-load of COMA and require that its Judges be increased to at least 9
or perhaps 15 and oblige them to sit in panels, the character of their re-
view is of such an infinitely higher standard as to be worth the cost. In
comparison money spent to keep these Boards of Review under the domi-
nation of a single Judge Advocate General is money wasted.
17. THE PENDING BILL STRIKES A DEATH BLOW To THE VERY
LIMITED AND INSUFFICIENT APPEAL JURISDICTION THAT COMA
Now HAS.
Before the Code was enacted, the following comment was made as
to the provisions under which you can appeal to COMA from the Board
of Review.
As has been suggested above, to all intents and purposes there is no differ-
ence between the Judge Advocate General and a District Attorney in civilian
life. Yet, despite this basic conflict of interests, subdivision (b) (2)
provides that the Judge Advocate General may order forward to the Court
of Military Appeals for review such cases as he pleases. Under this provi-
sion, only if your case interests the Judge Advocate General can you hope
to have an appeal. But there is another way. If you have been sentenced
to death or are an admiral or a general, subdivision (b) (1) gives you an
unqualified right to bring your case before the Court of Military Appeals.
To state this provision is to show its injustice. Everyone, regardless of rank,
should have his case automatically heard before this top civilian court.
There is a third way in which a case can be reviewed by the Court of
Military Appeals. Subdivision (b) (3) provides that upon petition of
the accused and on good cause shown, the Court of Military Appeals can
grant a review. The Code significantly does not tell us who is to make
this petition. Experience has shown that the great majority of defendants
in court-martial cases are far from mental giants. They are primarily
very young men, and in most cases very poorly educated men. They are
men who are in trouble largely because of poor home environment. They
are the children of divorced parents, and the real poor and neglected in
America. These men, if they are to exercise the right to file such a peti-
tion, will have to have assistance. The only ones who will not require
assistance are the wicked and the well-connected. This method of providing
an appeal by petition will result in the wrong kind of cases going to the
Court of Military Appeals and the right kind being buried in the Board
of Review in the Office of the Judge Advocate General.35
This prediction also has come true and it is shocking to see the
services propose that this inadequate right to appeal to COMA be further
restricted.
Moreover, before the Code was enacted, attention was called to the
fact that COMA's right to review was narrowly limited to questions of
law only whereas the country and the Congress were being led to believe
that COMA would pass on all aspects of a court-martial sentence.
Another defect in Article 67 is that it limits the Court of Military Appeals
to review of questions of law and chains this body to the facts as found
by command. Not even busy civil courts are limited to a review of the
law in criminal cases. If the task of reweighing the evidence should be-
come too arduous the Court can always be expanded. It is worth the
added expense if as a result even one innocent American boy is spared the
vilification of an unjust sentence.
Nor is it ever desirable to throw any court's jurisdiction into the contro-
versy inherent in the metaphysical distinctions between fact and law. For
example, is the obtaining of a confession by torture a question of fact or a
question of law? Cases of that sort are bound to be difficult to review
and the statute should be drawn so that the Court of Military Appeals has
an unlimited right to review questions of law. Can we be sure that the
Code, as it is now written guarantees review of tragedies like the "Sugar
Cane Rape Cases"?
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Study of the opinions by COMA will reveal that the Court has had
to devote unnecessary hours in trying to decide what is fact and what is
law. The services knew this and the provision was specifically designed
to limit the complete civilian review which Congress wanted.
With COMA unable to question the facts found below or change
the sentence in the absence of a legal technicality and no independent
clemency board of a standing comparable to COMA, the services have
unfettered control. Civilians should review both the facts and the sen-
tences so as to prevent their civilian sons and daughters drafted into the
services from being given a B.C.D. or a D.D. for life, unless their crime
was so heinous as to deserve it, and unless they are beyond rehabilitation.
Through no fault of its own, as the draft reached the bottom of the
barrel in World War II, the Armed Services found themselves with civil-
ian misfits: bums, taken from the park; confirmed criminals, gaining a
suspended sentence on condition they join the Army or the Navy. In all
the services there were dangerous psychopaths whom the prison psychia-
trists had no trouble identifying.
One unforgettable case was argued before the General Court-Martial
Sentence Review Board of the Navy. The prisoner as a young man fell
35 Ibid.
se Id. at 164.
in love with a young Jewish girl whose parents refused to allow her to
marry him. The poor lad's mind became affected. In naval service on
our west coast he brutally assaulted, raped and almost murdered one
young Jewish girl after another. The staff reviewing lawyer who pre-
sented this case to the Board asked that his sentence of 25 years be reduced
as recommended by the prison. To the Board's credit, it refused to reduce
this sentence one day in the absence of proof that the lad's mind had been
cured. What was there to gain in releasing him uncured, to prey upon
the civilian population? Congress should investigate how the services
are handling this problem. This is another reason why we must have a
Top Civilian Clemency Board, equal in dignity, standing and ability to
COMA, reporting directly to the Armed Services Committees of both
houses.
What does the pending bill provide as to the right of a convicted
person to appeal to COMA?
Here it is:
(w) Article 67 (b) (3) is amended to read as follows:
"(3) All cases reviewed by a board of review in which, upon petition of
the accused and on good cause shown, the Court of Military Appeals has
granted a review; but the court must consider a petition for a grant of
review only if-
"(A) counsel who represented the accused at his trial or before the
board of review;
"(B) appellate defense counsel appointed by the Judge Advocate
General if the accused was not represented by counsel before the board
of review; or
"(C) civilian counsel retained by the accused, certified that in his opinion,
a substantial question of law is presented and that the appeal is made
in good faith."
3 7
Observe, this bill would relieve COMA from hearing any appeal
where defense counsel did not certify "that in his opinion a substantial
question of law is presented and that the appeal is made in good faith."
The Seymour Court Committee considered this proposal and rejected it,
saying:
The Committee was definitely opposed to the proposal that the Court only
consider Petitions for Grant of Review when accompanied by a certificate
of merit from counsel. In this connection, it should be added that the Com-
mittee gave serious consideration to many other proposals that would reduce
the workload of the Court by cutting down its present heavy workload.
Except as set forth elsewhere in this report, we do not now favor placing
restrictions on appeals to the Court.3 8
And COMA, itself, is opposed to it.
The Court Committee disapproved of the recommendation suggested by the
Services which has for its purpose the reduction of the workload of the
Court and involved a proposed limitation of the Court's jurisdiction by
requiring counsel to accompany any petition for a grant of review with a
certificate of merit. The Judges of the Court believe that this particular
3 S. 2133, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
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proposal and recommendation is undesirable and, therefore, support the
position of the Court Committee. 8
Let me document why the proposal is so undesirable by reference to what
happened to Doe. The undesirability of this proposal becomes obvious
by looking at the brief submitted on behalf of Doe by defense counsel
assigned by the Judge Advocate General to represent him on his appeal
to COMA. That brief was three lines long, and said merely "Doe ap-
peals"!
Why was this? The answer is that the assigned defense counsel was
working with the unintelligble trial record in Washington when he
should have been talking to Doe at the prison. Had he done so, he would
have known that Doe was not represented by a lawyer, that a key witness
had not been called and that Doe claimed he had been advised by his lay
counsel not to take the stand.
No defense counsel, however competent, could be expected to do
on this basis the job that is called for. As might be expected, the brief,
to COMA is no brief at all. The appeal is no appeal at all. Defense
counsel goes through the motions. Moreover, had the defense counsel had
the benefit of an interview with the prisoner, he would doubtless have
made a motion for a new trial before time to appeal to COMA had ex-
pired. Civilian counsel for Doe had to move before the Judge Advocate
General and had the miserable experience of being refused not only the
Staff Judge Advocate's Review, but also evidence that was taken at public
expense in Korea-evidence not shown to defense counsel though used by
a special court of three Generals to deny Doe a new trial. Should appeal
to COMA have to depend upon a certification by counsel appointed by
the Judge Advocate General?
The judges at COMA confirm the experience of Doe. His insuffi-
cient COMA brief was not an isolated instance. Chief Judge Quinn told
the Brooks Committee that 33 per cent of appellate errors are found by
COMA when the judges with the aid of their Commissioners make an
independent examination of the record.40
In the case of Roe's appeal, there was an interesting development.
Before his defense counsel filed his brief in COMA, civilian counsel were
able to note their appearance. At that point the case had been affirmed
by a Board of Review in the JAG and the unjust sentence of 25 years
had been reduced to a mere ten years. Thereafter, Roe was restored to
duty and the appeal seemed to become pointless as he would then be free
to earn an honorable discharge. This illustrates the worst weakness in
the appeal system. The Judge Advocate General has discretion in allow-
ing appeals. Only cases involving a death sentence, or officers of flag
39 d. at 18.
40 See testimony of Chief Judge Quinn p. 344 transcript of Brooks Committee.
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rank are appealable as of right. To avoid such favoritism, the General
Court-Martial Sentence Review Board recommended that all cases be
appealed to COMA. This should be done even if COMA has to be in-
creased in the number of judges, and, has to sit in panels.
As matters stand, under the Code the Judge Advocates General can
ask or refrain from asking that an appeal be heard. Their Boards of
Review in the offices of the JAG can catch the bad cases as they come
from the field and hide them from COMA. The prison can order the
man restored to duty, as was done in Roe's case. It may well be that Roe's
restoration to duty was routine. It may be that other sentences are reduced
and that appeals are not requested in routine manner. But many feel
that the JAGS do not bring all the cases to COMA that should be brought
there. The JAGs have refused the writer permission to study the records
of any cases and the Congress has failed to establish a permanent Civilian
Advisory Council as asked. Under the circumstances Congress should
investigate and ascertain the facts. Moreover, it is a very dangerous prop-
osition to consider relieving COMA from hearing the petition for permis-
sion to appeal of a convicted G.I. when his counsel certify there is nothing
to appeal.
18. ADOPTION OF THE REFORM URGED BY THE HOOVER COMMIS-
SION OUGHT TO BE FOLLOWED BY HAVING ONE PROSECUTION JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL IN EACH SERVICE. OTHER NEEDED REFORMS:
ENLISTED MEN SHOULD SERVE ON COURTS; THERE SHOULD BE IN-
VESTIGATIONS CONCERNING FOREIGN SENTENCES UNDER STATUS
OF FORCES AGREEMENTS AND THE COMPARATIVE PUNISHMENT
OF OFFICERS WITH ENLISTED MEN.
1. During the year 1955, the Second Hoover Commission made its
valuable report on the legal procedures of the Federal Government. At
its mid-winter meeting in Chicago, the American Bar Association con-
sidered this report and adopted after debate and hearing Admiral Ira
Nunn, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy speaking in opposition,
the following resolution:
RESOLVED, That, in order to accomplish desired improvements in the
organization and legal services within the Department of Defense, the
American Bar Association recommends:
(a) That, within the Department of Defense and its constituent mili-
tary departments, professional responsibility over the entire legal
staff, and for all legal services, should be vested in a General
Counsel retaining the present rank of Assistant Secretary of
Defense.
(b) That a career service for civilian legal personnel should be developed
and supervised by a Civilian Legal Personnel Committee within
the Department of Defense.
(c) That professional responsibility over the entire legal staff, and for
all legal services, in the three military departments, subject to the
professional supervision of the Department of Defense General
Counsel, should be vested in the General Counsel of the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Force, each to have the rank of Assistant
Secretary.
(d) That the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force should each have a
Judge Advocate General's Corps or Department, under the direction
of a Judge Advocate General with the rank of Lieutenant General
or Vice Admiral.4
1
Under this proposal the entire responsibility for courts martial will
. placed in the Civilian Counsel For Defense and the Services but there
would be created in the Navy, a Judge Advocate's Corps of equal rank
and duties as in the Army and Air Force. As good as this suggestion is,
it leaves one Judge Advocate General to direct courts martial in each
service. Following the English pattern it would be better to split each
service department down the center by having a Prosecution Judge Advo-
cate General for the Navy and three similar ones in the Army, the Air
Force and the Coast Guard. The ideal solution would be one Prosecution
JAG and one Defense JAG for all services but so long as we maintain
our present defense establishment presumably we would have to let each
service have its own Judge Advocate General.
The same evils will persist in the Code so long as one Judge Advo-
cate General conducts courts martial. He cannot be a prosecutor and a
defender. Before we proceed to create one Navy JAG, should we not
consider splitting prosecution from defense, by having in each service
a Prosecution Judge Advocate under the Civilian General Counsel direct-
ing prosecution and a Defense Judge Advocate directing defense?
2. Bertram Schwarz called attention in his testimony before the
Brooks Committee to a serious mistake in drafting the provision permit-
ting the accused to elect to have an enlisted man on his court. Article 25
should be amended as Mr. Schwarz suggests to require that any enlisted
man appointed be of at least equal or lesser rank to the accused. The
bill of Senator Chamberlain that first suggested this has a provision that
merits study. Perhaps also the law officer should be given the appointing
power or a name should be drawn by lot."
3. Time has come for the Congress to investigate all cases of
American service men tried before foreign courts abroad. What were
their offenses? What were their sentences? Do we have status of forces
4 1 
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE TO
THE 1956 MID-YEAR MEETING OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 56. And see New York Times, Feb. 21, 1956, p. 17, col. 1.
42 See p. 269 transcript Brooks Committee.
43 In his testimony before the Brooks Committee, Bertram Schwartz called attention
to the need to give free counsel to service men tried in foreign courts under the Status
of Forces Agreement. The bill that does this (H.R. 7646) has passed the House and
the Senate in the 84th Congress and has become Public Law 777.
Congressman Brooks stated (p. 137) he favored a provision against trial of our
service men in foreign courts but Admiral Nunn opposed this view and agreed to submit
to the Committee a brief on the law. This came about when Generals Kuhfeld and
Caffey took the view that treaties are the supreme law of the land and under Missouri v.
Holland any law of the Congress modifying a treaty would be unconstitutional. This
executive agreements with countries not party to the North Atlantic
Treaty? If so, what countries are these and what service men, if any have
been tried in their courts? It may well be that in some countries, such as
Turkey and Morocco, a prisoner can be tortured or given life sentences
for minor offenses. The Congress should demand a full disclosure from
the services of all trials abroad. Only a thorough Congressional investiga-
tion will satisfy those of us who are disturbed about this unusual pro-
cedure.
4. The recent deaths of six marines in boot training and the sched-
uled court martial on July 14, 1956, of Sergeant McKeon raises the ugly
question whether the services punish officers on a parity with enlisted
men. One can take vindictive satisfaction in seeing this problem rise from
the ashes of World War II. One entire chapter of the Report of the Gen-
eral Court-Martial Sentence Review Board was devoted to this question
and it was one of the principal reasons why that Board asked that the
Congress create a permanent Advisory Council to study the problem. The
General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board reviewed the general
court martial of every man in a naval prison. Over 2000 cases were re-
viewed but, of these, only three were officers. One cannot rashly reach the
conclusion that officers are favored against enlisted men. Dismissal is a
most severe punishment to an officer; more severe than incarceration is
to an enlisted man, because at the end of the sentence it is possible to merit
restoration to duty through a clemency board.
A study of officer cases is long overdue and there is even more need
for it today than in 1947 when the General Court-Martial Sentence Re-
view Board asked for it in vain. Congress should do it now, starting
with the officer commanding Sergeant McKeon.
19. THE CONGRESS SHOULD SCRUTINIZE THE BILL INTRODUCED BY
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL WITHOUT APPROVAL OF COMA
OR THE SEYMOUR COURT COMMITTEE MOST CAREFULLY. CON-
GRESS SHOULD FIRST ENACT THE REFORMS REJECTED WHEN THE
CODE WAS So HURRIEDLY PASSED.
There is not time and space enough to comment at length as to the
bill introduced at the request of the three Judge Advocates General," but
this can be said:
1. The proposed amendment to Article I to redefine "convening
authority", so that cases can be referred to officers of equal as well as
seems to beg the real question, namely, whether any treaty subjecting our service men
involuntarily to a trial in a foreign court is constitutional. The Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives has before it the Joint Resolution (H.J.Res. 309,
84th Cong., 1st Sess.) of Representative Frank T. Bow of Ohio. Two printed volumes of
testimony before the Committee of which James P. Richards of South Carolina is Chairman
are available.
44S. 2133 and H.R. 6583, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955).
superior rank, is unwise as the present provision affords some small pro-
tection to the accused in that a "convening authority" of higher rank may
be more free to refuse to bring charges or, in bringing them, to modify
them. Moreover, both the Seymour Court Committee and COMA disap-
proved this provision.45
2. The section of the bill that amends Article 12 to permit confine-
ment of our servicemen with those of friendly foreign nations, was op-
posed by Judge Elbert P. Tuttle, when General Counsel of the Treasury,
as politically unwise for the services.4" The Seymour Court Committee
did not take a position on it but felt that further study was necessary, and
the Court agreed with this thought. It would seem unwise unless a posi-
tive showing can be made before Congress of its desirability and need.
3. It is proposed in various sections of the bill to permit the increase
in the powers of the commanding officer to confine or reduce pay of both
officers and enlisted men.47
In the Code there is a provision permitting the Navy to put a man
in the brig of a ship on bread and water for three days, which is cruel and
unusual punishment." The Judge Advocate General of the Navy in his
bill 9 suggested seriously that the summary court be permitted to put a
man on bread and water for 20 days50 and a general court for 30 days"'
on land or sea.
There was a storm of criticism " and apparently all that now sur-
vives of the Admiral's suggestion in the present bill is that men on land
as well as at sea can be put in confinement for seven days. Article 55 of
the Code bans cruel and unusual punishment and so does the Bill of
Rights. The bread and water provision should be torn out by the roots.
Increasing the power of the commander to cut pay, raises at once the need
to protect allotments of dependents at home. There seems to be no pro-
tection in the bill for this, and as in Doe's case it is unjust to hurt depend-
ents at home when the bread winner is in the service. And, of course,
before any changes in Article 15 are considered, the unanimous recom-
mendation" of the Joint Committee barring the special court from giving
45 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND
THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES 18, 26 (1953). Before
the Brooks Committee General Jones, the Assistant Judge Advocate of the Army cited
the case of General Swing as indicating the need of amendment of Articles 22 and 23
(p. 124).
46 Id. at 35.
4 See amendments proposed in bill to Article 15 of the Code.
48 Keeffe and Moskin, Codified Military Injustice, 35 Cornell L.Q. 151, 156 (1949).
49ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND
THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES 32-42 (1954).
5OId. at 34 (Article 20).
51 Ibid. (Article 19).
52 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 12, 1955, Brigadier General Thomas R. Phillips.
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a B.C.D. should be enacted. From the civilian point of view the military
should have the disciplinary powers they need provided (a) only a gen-
eral court can give a permanent bad mark, such as a B.C.D. or D.D.; and
(b) no court has the power to cut off family allotments.54
4. A one officer special court is provided in the bill "5 when the ac-
cused requests it in writing, the convening authority consents, the officer is
a lawyer and known to the accused in advance. For reasons discussed else-
where in this article, this provision is most unwise. One officer should not
be allowed to give a B.C.D. nor should special courts. The judgment of
three officers is needed: they are a jury.
But wholly apart from the severity of a bad conduct discharge there
is much force in what Judge Elbert P. Tuttle, on the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, said, as General Counsel to the Treasury, in dissenting from
this recommendation:
One-officer general and special courts-martial. This recommendation appears
to be contrary to the theory incorporated in the Code under which the
judgment of one officer is deemed adequate with respect to minor offenses,
the judgment of at least three officers is deemed necessary in cases of more
serious offenses involving more serious punishments, and the judgment of a
still broader cross-section is deemed desirable for the most serious cases
involving the most stringent penalties.
Presumably the reason for the recommendation is that the "existing
system requires the services of large numbers of line officers who could be
more profitably employed in their normal duties." If this is the reason,
the board appears to have underestimated the importance of the function
of military justice and the pressures behind the enactment of the Code
in the first place. Just as in the civilian judicial scheme jury service is
one of the highest duties of citizenship, so in the system of miliary justice
service on a court is one of the most important duties an officer can perform.
Defendants are very often young men under their majority whom the laws
of most jurisdictions will not permit to exercise the franchise. They are
away from their home surroundings and the people to whom they would
normally turn for advice and help in reaching a decision that may be of
utmost importance to their future lives. In addition, the very nature of
the necessary military relation between enlisted man and officer is such
as to make it most difficult for the former to make the decision which
will best protect his interests on a matter of this kind when a particular
course is suggested by an officer, regardless of how objective and fair the
latter may try to be in so doing. For these reasons I believe that the
request of the accused for a one-man court-martial will not, in many cases,
be made with the insight and judgment called for in such an important
exception to the basic theory of the Code. I would not, therefore, favor the
submission of this recommendation to the Congress. 56
At least three members are needed to consider the important clem-
ency factors. Experienced officers, as jurors, can understand them much
better than one officer, however good a lawyer he may be. The proposal
for one officer is fundamentally wrong, as it proceeds on the assumption
54ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND
THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES 9 (1954) (Articles 16,
25, 51 and 52).
55 Ibid.
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that since the accused is guilty and willing to take the legal punishment,
or if not guilty because the single officer is a lawyer, that is all that is
required. It is because most accused are guilty that we need the judgment
of three officers-not one lawyer alone-as to his punishment. This
provision is dangerous. Instead of it, the Code should be amended not
only to require a law officer on special courts but also to deprive such
courts of power to give a B.C.D., or cut off family allowances. There
will be little need to review any special courts in COMA if this change
is substituted.
5. One of the worst provisions in the bill is the proposed amend-
ment to Article 26 and 39 permitting the law officer to confer with the
court as to the form of the findings. Both the Seymour Committee and
COMA oppose it."7 Without repeating again all said elsewhere it should
be pointed out that until the Code the Navy never had a law officer. The
Army obtained one in 1920 and he was supposed to be a lawyer but the
Army did not always find it "practicable" to have one. The law officer is
the civilian judge; the court members, the civilian jury. Whoever heard
of the Judge going into the jury room to help decide the case? This is
what the Army law officer did. Even though he is a lawyer it seemed
unwise, so the Code made him conduct the trial, and decide only legal
points. This is as it should be. 8
6. The amendment to Article 37 to extend to staff officers the pro-
hibition against reprimanding courts, is highly desirable and approved
by the Seymour Committee."
One of the most unjust accusations made by the military against
the Code has been that it forces commanders to order either special or
general courts. The only objection that the civilian can legitimately have
to disciplinary punishment, which is not cruel and inhuman and does not
57Id. at 18, 27.
58 Testifying before the Brooks Committee with respect to the desirability of this
provision Admiral Nunn had a hard time. Asked to redraw the provision so as to
require the law officer to meet with the general court after it reached its decision in
open court in the presence of the defense counsel, Admiral Nunn and Mr. Nicander
of the staff of the House Armed Services Committee came up with this re-draft: "After
a general court has finally voted on the findings or the sentence, the court may request
the law officer and the reporter to appear before the court to put the findings or sentence
as the case may be in proper form and such proceedings shall be on the record." Observe
this excludes the defense counsel and leaves the reporter and law officer alone with the
court at a critical moment. Despite an extended discussion (pp. 188-193 and 193-194)
the Committee did not reject the re-draft as being unsatisfactory. During the course
of the discussion Admiral Nunn argued that a law officer is "no different actually
from a district attorney in civilian life who may one day be advanced to the bench"
(p. 195). At one point in his testimony Bertram Schwartz suggested that to avoid
having a law officer in the role of counsel one day and judge the next day the Code
should provide for a definite term (p. 217).
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fall on innocent dependents at home, is permanent punishment such as
the D.D., the B.C.D. and the Undesirable Discharge. Non-judicial punish-
ment should of course be limited, but the special court should be free to
give greater punishment of a disciplinary character thus reducing the
number of general courts. This does not force an officer to give a court
to a guilty man. The Code does not obligate any officer to charge any
one with crime if in his conscience he does not feel that charges should
be brought.
Apparently the services have forced a commander to bring charges
under the Code. His failure to do so is said to affect adversely his promo-
tion. This indicates the need for a course in Military Justice obligatory on
all officers. Congress should not leave it at that. It should amend Article
37 so that the decision of a commander whether to prefer charges shall
not be considered with respect to his promotion. As matters now stand
officers erroneously believe that the Code robs them of their discretion.
Like members of the court martial, commanders should be free to act
according to their conscience.
7. The amendment to Article 41 (b) is not supported by COMA,
does not appear to have been considered by the Seymour Committee, and
seems unwise. Before any change is made in the special court, take away
its power to give the B.C.D.6 °
8. Article 54 seems to be proper if it carried out the intent of the
Joint Committee.61
9. The amendment to Article 57 (b) does not appear to have the
approval of either the Seymour Committee or COMA.62 On its face it
raises a grave question concerning Congress' grant to the President of
powers to increase punishment, such as were exercised by both Presidents
60 Admiral Nunn testified before the Brooks Committee that the lowest enlisted
pay is now $78. The present bill would permit extra-judicial punishment of an enlisted
man by cutting his monthly pay one-half. In this case, to $39 (see p. 70). But the
Admiral assured the Committee this cut would have no effect on family allotments
(p. 114). (See also the testimony of Albert Pratt before the Brooks Committee.)
Despite the assurances of Admiral Nunn, there is a desperate need that the Congress
provide in the Code against any cut at any time in family allotments.
6 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND
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62 Admiral Nunn discussed this provision before the Brooks Committee (pp. 205-07),
as did General Kuhfeld. Their explanation for its need does not appear convincing.
General Jones testified that on October 1, 1954, President Eisenhower increased the
penalties under the Code by providing that if a man had three or more convictions during
the previous year (the possible maximum for each being less than a D.D.), then
henceforth he could be given a D.D., a T.F. and a year in jail. Both Admiral Nunn
and General Kuhfeld discuss the need with reference to a lad who breaks out of the
camp stockade and steals a car and is prosecuted by civilian authorities. The services
should accept what the civil courts do without trying the lad for breaking arrest or
anything else upon his return to his post. Rather than permit the President, ex parte, to
increase statutory penalties, the Congress should repeal such power as he now has,
specifically outlawing double jeopardy in any case. The constitutionality of the present
Code provisions under which the Congress purports to delegate this power to the
President is questionable.
Truman and Eisenhower. If sentences for crimes are to be lengthened from
the periods in the Code in peace or war, the Congress should do it, no
matter who is counsel. Moreover, the Code in Article 57 dates the sen-
tence from the day it is approved instead of when the man is put in jail6"
To correct this injustice the sentences should be made to run from the
date of confinement and neither the President nor anyone else should be
allowed to stop their running.
10. Article 65 (a) does not have the support of either the Seymour
Committee or COMA. It should be noted that it mentions the record as
containing "the opinion or opinions of the staff judge advocate or legal
officer... ." This emphasizes the point made in the discussion of the Doe
case. The Staff Judge Advocate's Review should be abolished and no
official recognition of such document should be given by the Congress.
Prepared in secret, containing unchecked hearsay denied to civilian de-
fense counsel it is calumnious. Congress should do what is suggested
elsewhere, namely, provide for both a Prosecution and Defense JAG at
the trial level and let both appear and give their opinion to the convening
authority. The district attorney should not be permitted to be heard
alone in secret. In addition, a transcript should be made of what is said,
for all to read."4
63 Keeffe and Moskin, Codified Military Injustice, 35 Cornell L.Q. 151, 160 (1949).
64 Before the Brooks Committee came Admirals Nunn and Holloway for the Navy,
General Kuhfeld for the Air Force, Couser for the Coast Guard, Assistant Judge Advocate
Jones for the Army and Albert Pratt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. All testified
in favor of the bill. Nunn said "in the main" the Code of Military Justice was "a
splendid one" (p. 110). And he frankly stated "the great majority of the offenses for
which we punish personnel in the Armed Services are not crimes at all in the civil
life" (p. 60). Some 73% he said were absent offenses and some 8% more purely mili-
tary offenses for which there is no counterpart in civilian life (p. 61). But the Admiral
admitted that unlike the General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board, the Navy has
not made any comparison of its sentences with civilian sentences (p. 68). Nor should it.
This is the job of a Top Clemency Board and a Civilian Advisory Council. It seems
the bill was cleared not only by the Defense Department but also by the Justice Depart-
ment (p. 54), but the Navy is the "executive agent within the Department of Defense
for presenting the bill (p. 54). From the time of arrest to the point when a case
reaches the desk of the Judge Advocate General takes an average of 91.5 days in the
Navy and 30 more, or 121.5 days to get it through the Boards of Review. Nunn says the
Code cost the Navy 52 million dollars in 1953. Spent otherwise the funds would have
paid for 30,000 enlisted men and 300 training aircraft (p. 58). Presumably it would
have bought a lot of postage stamps; but with or without a Code, discipline problems
have to be handled. In a total military budget of over 80 billion dollars, 52 million
dollars is minimal. At another point Admiral Nunn said: "our criminal problem can
be likened most accurately to the problem of juvenile delinquency in civilian life"
(pp. 60-61). But do we give permanent black character marks such as the Bad Conduct
Discharge, the Dishonorable Discharge and the Undesirable Discharge to juvenile de-
linquents in civilian life? Admiral Nunn (p. 162) and General Kuhfeld (p. 159) gave
the following courts-martial figures for the Navy and Air Force, respectively.
Number of Trials Per 1000





11. The proposed amendments of Articles 65, 66, 67 and 69 concern
review.65 The principal proposal is in Article 67 to relieve COMA from
considering applications to appeal when not certified by defense counsel.
For reasons stated elsewhere it is most unwise. See particularly the dis-
cussion of the brief for Doe in COMA. Moreover, the Seymour Committee
and COMA oppose the provisions," and, as indicated, what is needed is
a radical revision of the review procedures. The boards of review are a
waste of time and money and should be abolished and every case should
be appealed to COMA.6" There should be a Chief Defense Counsel68 or
a Prosecution Judge Advocate General and a Defense Judge Advocate
General in each service reporting to the Civilian General Counsel who
would in turn report to the General Counsel of the Defense Department.
More important, there should be a review from COMA to the Supreme
Court of the United States. Review in the federal courts by habeas corpus
is well-nigh impossible.6" Appeal to the Supreme Court, if it can be




It will be observed that this indicates the Air Force has been doing a much better
job than other services than the Coast Guard. General Kulfeld attributes the low Air
Force rate to the Air Force's 3320 Retraining Center at Amarillo, Texas. Restorations
to duty at Amarillo are reported at a high percentage figure. Albert Pratt disclosed that
from July 1 to December 3, 1954, the Navy's retraining command discharged 3352 of
whom it restored only 863 of these 560 were making the grade. Pratt could say nothing
about the 2489 discharged. Pratt's job is to review officer cases, administrative discharges
and cases decided by the Naval Clemency Board. Jones made the following report to
the Brooks Committee of Army trials (p. 160):











In 1955 there were 9,436 Army General Courts, 49,000 specials and 75,000 summaries.
If permitted to confine for 7 days, the Army would use this punishment at regimental
level (not company) to cut down its summary courts.
65 One provision in the bill relieves COMA of reviewing cases where the accused
pleaded guilty. Chief Judge Quinn favors this amendment (p. 347). But the American
Legion rightly opposes it (p. 409). The experience of the General Court-Martial Sentence
Review Board was that some of its worst cases arose after pleas of guilty. The present
provision in the Code is based on good experience. We must remember these prisoners
are young men, "juvenile delinquents" to quote Admiral Nunn, and may be very ill-
advised in pleading guilty.
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appear to have been contrary to Supreme Court decisions, namely the
catheter, the treason, and the camp follower cases,7" upon each of which
there is a note in this issue. Unless the Supreme Court can take by certio-
rari cases from COMA as it does from the Court of Claims there will be
many more such conflicts developing. It may be that the Supreme Court
can only hear an appeal from an Article III Court but since appeals from
the Court of Claims are heard, legislation that is constitutional, perhaps,
can be drawn. If it can, Supreme Court review should be provided."
12. Even though COMA"2 approves the amendment to Article 71
cutting off the pay of one sentenced to die, the family allowance should
be maintained at least until one year after execution.
13. The amendment to Article 71 (d) appears to be opposed by
Judge Tuttle for the Treasury," by the Seymour Committee" and by
COMA." COMA suggested certain safeguards but it does not appear
that the bill contains them. Judge Tuttle's point that the accused cannot
judge for himself because while he is in jail he longs to get out and will
accept a punitive discharge when he should not, deserves Congressional
consideration.
14. Article 72 should not be amended until the right of a special
court to give a B.C.D. is removed.
15. The two-year new trial provision is desirable. But Article 73
should include a provision allowing COMA for two years hence to review
a case such as Doe's-discussed in the text-where it is too late to appeal
to COMA. Moreover, a provision for appeal by way of writ coram nobis
should be written into Article 73. An appeal can be taken to our federal
courts by writ of coram nobis, why not to COMA under the same limits?
16. The amendment to Article 95 lacks the support of COMA and
its merits cannot be judged. Rather than comment on it, attention is
called to the failure of the Code to abolish double jeopardy, and that a
man who breaks arrest usually does a civilian wrong. If the civilian court
tries him, the military should not be able to do so."
70 See also United States v. Sutton, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 220 (1953) (admissability of
depositions).
71 Colonel Dietrich, before the Brooks Committee on behalf of the Reserve Officers
Association, opposed a reduction in appeal time to COMA from 30 to 15 days on the
ground that this would hurt a lad overseas who might want to communicate with his
family at home as to the conduct of the appeal (p. 288). If 33 per cent of the appellate
errors are discovered by COMA, consideration should be given by the family to the
employment of a civilian lawyer. The American Legion by John Finn, Esq., opposed
also any reduction in appeal time to COMA (p. 410).
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17. For reasons discussed elsewhere, the bill for a Navy Judge
Advocate General Corps77 should not be enacted until provision is made
for a Prosecution Judge Advocate General and a Defense Judge Advocate
General. The conflict of interest now in each Judge Advocate General
must be eliminated.
18. The bill of Senator Hennings 8 to set up an Article III Court to
try Toth should be extended if it can be, so as to try camp followers, and
civilians in the trust territories of the Pacific. The provisions in Article
106 under which ordinary civilians face trial should be removed from
the Code."9
19. Last but most important of all is that Congress pass the Brooks'
Bill s" to increase COMA to five judges and give all life terms. COMA
has done a magnificent job. Its members should have life terms so they
can afford to be independent of the JAGS. The present disagreement as
to the pending bill between COMA and JAG illustrates the need that
the Court be protected by the security of life tenure, the way our federal
court judges are.
The failure of Congress to give the judges at COMA life tenure
has risen to haunt them in the administration of the forty-two employees
of the Court. Civil Service has asserted jurisdiction over them even
though Felix Larkin once expressed the view that it had no jurisdiction
over the Court. Indeed, the Civil Service Commission has ruled that
though created by the Congress under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitu-
tion, COMA is part of the executive branch. Also the three judges at
COMA cannot retire on the judicial pension given to other judges. This
is a serious personal matter. Since they get the pay and rank of a United
States Circuit Judge the Congress should give them equal pension rights.
John Marshall at the Virginia Constitutional Convention in 1828
put the case for an independent judiciary in a way that cannot be contra-
dicted. He said:
Advert, sir, to the duties of a judge-he has to pass between the Government
and a man whom that Government is prosecuting; between the most power-
ful individual in the community and the poorest and most unpopular-the
Judicial Department comes home to every man's fireside; it passes on his
property, his reputation, his life, his all. Is it not to that last degree
important that he should be rendered perfectly and completely independent
with nothing to influence or control him but God and his conscience? You
do not allow a man to perform the duties of a juryman or a judge, if he has
one dollar interest in the matter to be decided: and we will allow a judge
7TS. 2527 and S. 2502, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
78 S. 2791, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
79 Keeffe and Moskin, Codified Military Injustice, 35 Cornell L.Q. 151, 152-53, 167
(1949). Bertram Schwartz testifying before the Brooks Committee asked also that the
Hennings bill be broadened to cover offenses (like Icardi and Lo Dolce) alleged to have
been committed prior to the enactment of the Code of Military Justice and therefore
subject to the Articles governing the Navy or the Articles of War (p. 276).
80H.R. 2555, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
to give a decision when his office may depend on it? When his decision
may offend the powerful and influential man . . . if they may be removed at
pleasure will any lawyer of distinction come upon your bench? No, Sir, I
have always thought, from my earliest youth till now, that the greatest
scourge an angry heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and sinning
people was an ignorant, a corrupt or dependent judiciary.
8 '
What Marshall said of the ordinary federal judge is doubly true of
the judges at COMA. They must stand between the military and the serv-
ice man. We need judges of the greatest competence and courage to do
that. In Chief Judge Quinn and Judges Latimer, Brosman and Ferguson
we have been fortunate indeed. All have asked for life tenure as the
original bill provided. Only in this way can the average citizen be sure
that the Court will attract the right kind of lawyer and remain independ-
ent and fearless.
COMA has been doing an outstanding job. It has reviewed 8500
cases in 5 years or an average of 1800 per year. It hears an average of
150 appeals per month and in one month heard 228. Nevertheless, the
Court is up to date in its work which is more than can be said for the
ordinary federal district courts. See Judge Quinn's testimony before the
Brooks Committee (pp. 344, 355).
20. COMA divided 2 to 1 on the validity of the section of the Code
that permits the use in a court-martial of a deposition. Chief Justice Quinn,
greatly to his credit, takes the view that the entire Constitution of the
United States, including the Bill of Rights applies to courts martial under
the Code of Military Justice. His opinion was opposed by Judge Brosman
and Judge Latimer who take the position that the absence or death of a
witness should prevent a criminal trial, civil or military. Yet the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides for the confronta-
tion of the accused by the witness against him and it is difficult to believe
that the constitutional provision is satisfied when the accused is not even
present to see and hear the witness give his deposition.
On the motion for a new trial in Doe's case an even more unconsti-
tutional use was made of depositions by the Judge Advocate General.
He took depositions at public expense in Korea. He would not even
exhibit these to defense counsel. Moreover, in hearing counsel on the
motion for a new trial, three Generals sat in stoic silence and the Govern-
ment made no argument oral or written as to its position on the motion.
It must be that the JAG's trial counsel communicated his views secretly
to the court because defense counsel never received them. The court of
three Generals, however, denied the motion for a new trial on the basis of
81 1 am indebted to Deans Fordham and Husted of the University of Pennsylvania
Law School for this quotation from Marshall, John Marshall and the Rule of Law, 104
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 60 (1955).
these secret affidavits taken abroad. 2
21. Consideration should be given to amending Article 46 of the
Code either to compel the trial judge advocate to list with the defense
judge advocate the names and addresses of his witnesses in advance, or
to relieve the defense judge advocate of having to apply to the trial judge
advocate before subpoenaing his witnesses."3
22. Apparently the 1951 Manual in Chapter 26 provides that
neither the Navy nor the Coast Guard may demand court martial in lieu
of punishment under Article 15. The Fleet Reserve Association calls
attention to its inapplicability to the Army or Air Force."'
23. The Congress should consider enacting a statute to declare that
except as the Constitution otherwise provides, ,the Bill of Rights protects
our service men. This would in effect codify the dissenting opinion of
Chief Judge Quinn in United States v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509
(1954). It would also make clear that any serviceman treated unjustly is
free to write his family, his local newspaper, his Congressman, his Senator
or the President. Men have been court-martialled for complaining in this
manner, instead of proceeding through "channels" and it is not fair to
civilian draftees. It may be all right for West Pointers or Annapolis men.
20. THE ONLY HOPE FOR REFORM LIES IN THE CREATION BY
CONGRESS OF A PERMANENT, PAID, PART-TIME CIVILIAN ADVISORY
COUNCIL.
The only hope for the civilian parent that his offspring will be dealt
with fairly, if he makes a mistake and does something wrong when in
the service, is for the Congress to establish a Civilian Advisory Council.
It should be appointed by the President. It should be paid because nothing
is more obvious in this world of ours than that you get what you pay for.
It should be part-time and for a limited number of staggered terms, not
over 5 or 6 in length, so no governmental bureaucracy will develop. It
should have a paid full-time staff placed at its disposal by the Department
of Defense. It should have access to all courts-martial files and all prison
82 Bertram Schwartz asked the Brooks Committee to ban depositions entirely where
a D.D. and T.F. (Total Forfeiture of Pay) was to be the penalty. And he referred to a
case in Tokyo where the chief witness who gave the deposition was in an insane asylum
(pp. 270-71). Charles E. Lofgren, National Secretary of the Fleet Reserve Association
(pp. 307-08), testified that "the attorneys for the Fleet Reserve Association" say "there
is no more unfair provision in the code so far as they are concerned." They take the
position of Chief Judge Quinn that the use of depositions is unconstitutional. For a
discussion of this point and Usited States v. Sutton, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 220 (1953), by Chief
Judge Quinn, see pp. 361-62.
83 Bertram Schwartz wants Article 46 amended so that without giving notice to the
trial judge advocate the defense counsel may serve his own subpoenas (p. 272). But
Judge Latimer makes a good point when he asks that Article 46 be amended so as to
require notice to the other side before either the trial judge advocate or defense counsel
subpoena any witness, thereby avoiding surprise (pp. 360-65).
84 See pp. 307-08 of the transcript of the Brooks Committee.
files and authorized to investigate every nook and cranny. Annually, this
Civilian Advisory Council should be compelled to report to the Armed
Services Committees of the House and Senate. Give the American people
this protection and, perhaps, the need for Congressional investigation of
courts martial in the future will diminish. Today we need a thorough
Congressional investigation by the Judiciary Committees and the Armed
Services Committees of the administration of military courts martial in
Korea by the Judge Advocate Generals to lay a proper and informed basis
for new legislation.*
* In the writing of this piece the author acknowledges the assistance of the editor-in-
chief of the Review, Emidio Spurio of Philadelphia, and a careful editing by Dean Vernon
X. Miller. Neither Mr. Spurio nor Dean Miller are responsible for the views expressed.
They are the author's own.
APPENDIX
S.2133
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
A BILL
To amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the Uniform Code of Military Justice (sec. 1, Act
of May 5, 1950; 64 Stat. 107; 50 U. S. C. 551 and the following) is amended as follows:
(a) Article 1 is amended by changing the period at the end thereof to a semicolon
and inserting a new clause (15), as follows:
"(15) 'Convening authority' shall be construed to refer to the officer who convened
the court, an officer commanding for the time being, a successor in command, or any
officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction."
(b) Article 12 is amended to read as follows:
"ART. 12. Confinement with enemy prisoners prohibited
"No member of the Armed Forces of the United States shall be placed in confinement
in immediate association with enemy prisoners or other foreign nationals not members
of the Armed Forces of the United States, except that a member of the Armed Forces
of the United States may be confined in United States confinement facilities with members
of the armed forces of friendly foreign nations."
(c) Article 15 (a) (1) (C) is amended by deleting the words "one month" at the
end thereof and substituting therefor the words "three months".
(d) Article 15 (a) (2) (E) is amended by deleting the words "if imposed upon
a person attached to or embarked in a vessel,".
(e) Article 15 (a) (2) is amended by (1) changing the period at the end of
clause (F) to a semicolon and inserting immediately thereafter the word "or", and (2)
inserting a new clause (G), as follows:
"(G) forfeiture of not to exceed one-half of one month's pay."
(f) Article 16 (2) is amended to read as follows:
"(2) Special courts-martial, which shall consist of any number of members not less
than three, except that a special court-martial may consist only of a law officer, if prior
to the convening of the court, the accused has so requested in writing, upon advice of
counsel, and the convening authority has consented thereto, and the identity of the law
officer is known to the accused in advance of the date of trial."
(g) Articles 22 (b) and 23 (b) are amended to read as follows:
"(b) When any such officer is an accuser, the court shall be convened by a competent
authority not subordinate in command and grade to the accuser, and may in any case
be convened by a superior competent authority when deemed desirable by him."
(h) Article 25 (a) is amended by inserting the following new sentence at the end
thereof: "However, to be eligible for appointment as a special court-martial, the officer shall
have the qualifications specified for a law officer in article 26 (a)."
(i) Article 26 (b) is amended to read as follows:
"(b) The law officer shall not consult with the members of the court, other than on
the form of the findings and the sentence as provided in article 39, except in the presence
of the accused, trial counsel, and defense counsel, nor shall he vote with the members
of the court."
(j) The first sentence of article 37 is amended to read as follows: "No authority
convening a general, special, or summary court-martial, nor other commanding officer, nor
any officer serving on the staffs thereof, shall censure, reprimand, or admonish such
court or any member, law officer, or counsel thereof, with respect to the' findings or
sentence adjudged by the court, or with respect to any other exercise of its or his
functions in the conduct of the proceedings."
(k) The second sentence of article 39 is amended to read as follows: "After a
general court-martial has finally voted on the findings or the sentence, the court may re-
quest the law officer and the reporter to appear before the court to put the findings or
the sentence, as the case may be, in proper form, and such proceedings shall be on the
record."
(1) Article 41 (b) is amended to read as follows:
"(b) Each accused and trial counsel shall be entitled to one peremptory challenge,
but the law officer and an officer appointed as a special court-martial shall not be chal-
lenged except for cause."
(m) Article 51 is amended by inserting at the end thereof the following:
"(d) The foregoing provisions of this article shall not apply to a special court-
martial consisting of only one officer. Notwithstanding any other provision of this code,
the officer who is appointed as such a court-martial shall determine all questions of law
and fact arising during a trial by such court and shall, in the event of conviction of the
accused, adjudge an appropriate sentence."
(n) The second sentence of article 51 (b) is amended to read as follows: "Any
such ruling made by the law officer of a general court-martial upon any interlocutory
question other than the question of the accused's sanity shall be final and shall constitute
the ruling of the court, but the law officer may change any such ruling at any time during
the trial."
(o) Article 52 is amended by inserting at the end thereof the following:
"(d) This article shall not apply to a special court-martial consisting of only one
officer."
(p) Article 54 is amended to read as follows:
"ART. 54. Record of trial
"(a) Each court-martial shall keep a separate record of the proceedings of the trial
of each case brought before it. A record of trial in which the sentence adjudged includes
a punitive discharge or confinement at hard labor in excess of six months or forfeiture in
excess of two-thirds pay per month for six months shall contain a complete verbatim
account of the proceedings and testimony before the court, and shall be authenticated in
such manner as may be required by regulations which the President may prescribe. All
other records of trial shall contain such matter and be authenticated in such manner as
may be required by regulations which the President may prescribe."
"(b) A copy of the record of the proceedings of each general and special court-
martial shall be given to the accused as soon as authenticated. If a verbatim record of
trial by general court-martial is not required under the provisions of (a) above, the
accused may purchase such a record under regulations which the President may prescribe."
(q) Article 57 (b) is amended by inserting at the end thereof the following new
sentence: "The President may prescribe other periods during which a sentence to confine-
ment may be interrupted and such periods shall be excluded in computing the service
of the term of confinement."
(r) Article 65 (a) is amended to read as follows:
"(a) When the convening authority has taken final action in a general court-martial
case and the sentence as approved by him includes a bad-conduct discharge or exceeds a
sentence that could have been adjudged by a special court-martial, he shall forward the
entire record, including his action thereon and the opinion or opinions of the staff judge
advocate or legal officer, to the appropriate Judge Advocate General. All other general
court-martial records shall be transmitted and disposed of as the Secretary of the Depart-
ment may prescribe by regulations."
(s) Article 65 (b) is amended by deleting the words "to be reviewed by a board
of review" wherever appearing therein.
(t) Article 65 (c) is amended to read as follows:
"(c) All other special and summary court-martial records shall be forwarded to the
officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the command, or such other
authority as may be designated by the Secretary of the Department, for review by a
judge advocate of the Army or Air Force, a law specialist or lawyer of the Navy, or a
law specialist or lawyer of the Coast Guard or Treasury Department. In addition to
returning such records to the convening authority with a direction that certain action
be taken, the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction, or the authority desig-
nated by the Secretary of the Department, may take the same action with respect to
such records as is authorized for the convening authority. Such records shall be trans-
mitted and disposed of as the Secretary of the Department may prescribe by regulations."
(u) Article 66 (b) is amended to read as follows:
"(b) The Judge Advocate General shall refer to a board of review the record in
every case of trial by court-martial in which the sentence, as approved, affects a general
or flag officer, or extends to death, or to the dismissal of an officer, cadet, or midshipman.
He shall also refer to a board of review the record in every case of trial by court-
martial in which the sentence, as approved, extends to dishonorable or bad-conduct dis-
charge, or to confinement for one year or more, unless such dishonorable or bad-conduct
discharge, or confinement for one year or more, was adjudged in a case where the
accused pleaded guilty to each offense of which he was found guilty, and has affirmatively
stated that review by a board of review is not desired."
(v) Article 66 (e) is amended to read as follows:
"(e) The Judge Advocate General may discuss the charges whenever the board of
review has ordered them dismissed or whenever the board of review has ordered a rehear-
ing and he finds a rehearing impracticable. Otherwise, the Judge Advocate General shall,
unless there is to be further action by the President, or the Secretary of the Department,
or the Court of Military Appeals, instruct the convening authority to take action in
accordance with the decision of the board of review. If the board of review has ordered
a rehearing and the convening authority finds a rehearing impracticable, he may dismiss
the charges."
(w) Article 67 (b) (3) is amended to read as follows:
"(3) All cases reviewed by a board of review in which, upon petition of the
accused and on good cause shown, the Court of Military Appeals has granted a review; but
the court must consider a petition for a grant of review only if-
"(A) counsel who represented the accused at his trial or before the board of
review;
"(B) appellate defense counsel appointed by the Judge Advocate General if the
accused was not represented by counsel before the board of review; or
"(C) civilian counsel retained by the accused, certifies that in his opinion a
substantial question of law is presented and that the appeal is made in good faith."
(x) Article 67 (c) is amended to read as follows:
"(c) The accused shall have fifteen days from the time he is notified of the decision
of a board of review to petition the Court of Military Appeals for a grant of review, but
such petition shall not deprive the board of review of jurisdiction over his case until
the petition or other document is received in the Court of Military Appeals. The court
shall act upon such a petition within thirty days of the receipt thereof."
(y) Article 67 (f) is amended to read as follows:
"(f) After it has acted on a case, the Court of Military Appeals may direct the Judge
Advocate General to return the record to the board of review for further review in
accordance with the decision of the court. The Judge Advocate General may dismiss the
charges whenever the Court of Military Appeals has ordered them dismissed or whenever
the court has ordered a rehearing and he finds a rehearing impracticable. Otherwise, the
Judge Advocate General shall, unless there is to be further action by the President or the
Secretary of the Department, instruct the convening authority to take action in accordance
with the decision of the court. If the court has ordered a rehearing and the convening
authority finds a rehearing impracticable, he may dismiss the charges."
(z) Article 69 is amended to read as follows:
"ART. 69. Review in the Office of the Judge Advocate General
"Every record of trial by court-martial, in which there has been a finding of guilty
and a sentence, the appellate review of which is not otherwise provided for by articles
65 and 66, shall be examined in the Office of the Judge Advocate General. The Judge
Advocate General may refer any such record to a board of review for review in accordance
with article 66. If any part of the findings or sentence is found unsupported in law,
the Judge Advocate General shall either refer the record to a board of review for review
in accordance with article 66 or take such action in the case as is authorized for a board
of review under article 66 (c) and (d). If the record is reviewed by a board of review,
there shall be no further review by the Court of Military Appeals except pursuant to
the provisions of article 67 (b) (2). The Judge Advocate General is not required
to affirm a finding of guilty or a sentence found correct in law and fact."
(aa) Article 71 is amended to read as follows:
"ART. 71. Execution of sentence; suspension of sentence
"(a) No court-martial sentence extending to death or involving a general or flag
officer shall be ordered executed until approved by the President. He shall approve the
sentence or such part, amount, or commuted form of the sentence as he sees fit, and may
suspend the execution of the sentence or any part of the sentence, as approved by him,
except the death sentence. After the approval of a sentence extending to death by the
convening authority, an accused shall accrue no pay or allowances unless such sentence is
set aside or disapproved and a sentence extending to death is not imposed upon a new
trial or rehearing.
"(b) Except as provided in (d) below, no sentence or portion of a sentence ex-
tending to the dismissal of an officer (other than a general or flag officer), cadet, or
midshipman shall be ordered executed until approved by the Secretary of the Department,
or such Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary as may be designated by him. He shall
approve the sentence or such part, amount, or commuted form of the sentence as he sees
fit, and may suspend the execution of any part of the sentence as approved by him. In
time of war or national emergency he may commute a sentence of dismissal to reduction
to any enlisted grade. A person who is so reduced may be required to serve for the
duration of the war or emergency and six months thereafter.
"(c) Except as provided in (d) below, no sentence or portion of a sentence extending
to dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge shall be ordered executed until approved by
the Judge Advocate General or affirmed by a board of review, as the case may be,
and, in cases reviewed by it, the Court of Military Appeals.
"(d) All court-martial sentences and portions of sentences not involving dismissal
or dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge may be ordered executed by the convening au-
thority when approved by him. The convening authority may suspend the execution
of any sentence, except a death sentence."
(bb) Article 72 (a) is amended to read as follows:
"(a) Prior to the vacation of the suspension of a special court-martial sentence
which as approved includes a bad-conduct discharge, or of a general court-martial sentence
which as approved includes a bad-conduct discharge or exceeds a sentence that could
have been adjudged by a special court-martial, the officer having special court-martial
jurisdiction over the probationer shall hold a hearing on the alleged violation of probation.
At such hearing the probationer shall be represented by counsel if he so desires."
(cc) Article 73 is amended to read as follows:
"ART. 73. Petition for a new trial
"At any time within two years after approval by the convening authority of a court-
martial sentence which extends to death, dismissal, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge,
or confinement for one year or more, the accused may petition the Judge Advocate
General for a new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence or fraud on the court.
If the accused's case is pending before a board of review or before the Court of Military
Appeals, the Judge Advocate General shall refer the petition to the board or court,
respectively, for action. The board of review or the Court of Military Appeals, as appropri-
ate, shall determine whether a new trial, in whole or in part, should be granted, or shall
take appropriate action under article 66 or article 67, respectively. Otherwise, the Judge
Advocate General may grant a new trial in whole or in part, or may vacate or modify
the findings and sentence in whole or in part."
(dd) Article 95 is amended to read as follows:
"ART. 95. Arrest and physical restraint
"Any person subject to this Code who resists apprehension or breaks arrest or who
escapes from physical restraint lawfully imposed shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct."
(ee) The following is inserted as article 123a:
"ART. 123a. Making, drawing, or uttering check, draft, or order without sufficient funds
"Any person subject to this Code who--
"(1) for the procurement of any article or thing of value, or
"(2) for the payment of any past-due debt or other obligation, or
"(3) for any purpose with intent to defraud, makes, draws, utters, or delivers any
check, draft, or order for the payment of money upon any bank or other depository,
knowing at the time that the maker or drawer has not or will not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the bank or other depository for the payment of that check, draft, or
order in full upon its presentment, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. The
making, drawing, uttering, or delivering by a maker or drawer of a check, draft, or
order, payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds of the
maker or drawer in its possession or control, shall be prima facie evidence of his intent
to defraud and of his knowledge of insufficient funds in, or credit with, that bank
or other depository, if the maker shall not have paid the holder thereof the amount
due thereon within five days after receiving notice in person, or writing, that the check,
draft, or order has not been paid. The word 'credit', as used herein, shall be construed to
mean arrangement or understanding, express or implied, with the bank or other deposi-
tory for the payment of that check, draft, or order."
SEC. 2. This Act shall become effective on the first day of the tenth month after
approval of this Act.
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New York 3, New York
Dear Mr. Keeffe:
This will acknowledge receipt of your letter postmarked April
7, 1954, concerning the availability of the docket files of the
Court.
I'm sorry that I was not in my office on the occasion of your
recent visit. However, Mr. Hanlon, the Deputy Clerk, informs me
that he spoke to you about this same subject matter. As he mentioned
to you, the docket file in each individual case, filed with this
office pursuant to Article 67 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
is considered a public record which can be examined at any time during
the working hours of the Court. In addition, the original records of
trial, if not classified for security purposes, are also available for
public inspection. It may be noted, however, that such records are in
this office only while under review by members of the Court. As soon
as final action is taken on a record, it is immediately returned to
the Office of The Judge Advocate General concerned. Allied papers,
including Staff Judge Advocate reports, are attached to the original
court-martial records and, as such, are also returned to the appro-
priate service.
There is enclosed a copy of the Annual Report, which was recently
forwarded to the Congress.
Very truly yours,
AFRED C. PROUIX
Encl. Clerk of the 
Court
1 - Annual Report.
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Professor A. H. John Keeffe
New York University School of Law
Washington Square
New York 3, New York
Dear Professor Keeffe:
Receipt is acknowledged of your letter dated 5 April
1954 in which you request that records of my office be
made available to you or your representative.
Disciplinary records of military personnel are con-
sidered to be confidential in nature and cannot be made




The Judge Advocate General
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25. D. C. IN REPLV PcreR TO
3 3 APR 19S4




New York 3, N. Y.
Dear Professor Keeffe:
I have received your letter of April 5, 1954, and an en-
closed copy of a letter to the U. S. Court of Military
Appeals, wherein you express the desire to study courts-
martial cases since World War II, particularly courts
during the Korean conflict, with the object of suggesting
any needed reforms or changes in the system. You requested
assurance that records in my office would be available
to you or your representative for use in connection with
the study.
I appreciate your interest in the subject, and your motive
in undertaking the study, however, I am constrained to
advise that under existing laws and regulations the courts-
martial records of officers and enlisted men in the naval
service may not be disclosed to you.
Accordingly, you are advised that I am not permitted to





DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
C )* WASHINGTON 25. D.C.
OFFICE OF TH JGE ADVOCATE GENRA 14 APR 1954




New York 3, N. Y.
Dear Professor Keeffe:
Your letter of 5 April 1954 addressed to The Judge Advocate
General concerning your request to make available for study
court-martial records of trial involving Air Force personnel
who were tried during the Korean conflict period has been re-
ferred to me for reply.
I appreciate your interest in the administration of military
Justice and realize that your request was prompted by a desire to
make constructive and remedial suggestions with respect thereto,
if warranted. However, it has long been the policy of the Air
Force to refrain from disclosing details of the proceedings of
trial by court-martial of the members of the military service to
persons having no official connection therewith. As you can
understand, this policy does not restrict the release of news-
worthy information to news agencies nor is it based upon any
desire for secrecy concerning the administration of military
Justice, but rather has proved necessary in the interest of econ-
omy, to preserve privileged communications, for the protection
of individuals whose duties require them to participate in the
trial of such cases, and of the persons tried.
Aside from the foregoing, I am sure you will realize the
impracticability of permitting a general inspection of all of
these numerous records. To do so would seriously hamper the
normal activity in the performance of official duties in the
Office of The Judge Advocate General.





The Assistant Judge Advocate General
United States Air Force
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
APR 1 6 1954
Dear Mr. Keeffe:
This will acknowledge your letter of April 5,
1954, requesting assurance that records of this
Department will be made available to you in con-
nection with any study of courts-martial that you
make.
I regret that I must advise you that it is
not the policy of this Department to disclose
records of courts-martial.
Very truly yours,
Secretary of the Treasury
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